Keynote Presentations:
Giants of WWII (Keynote version)--Admirals Nimitz, Halsey, King, Spruance, Kinkaid, Yarnell, Burke and Richardson comment on the treatment of Admiral Kimmel.
Giants of WWII (Quicktime movie)
Videos:
Kimmel Family appeal to President Bush (17.3Mb)
Kimmel Family appeal to President Bush (8.4Mb)
Tom's Documents:
"Pre-Pearl Harbor Attack Intelligence--Importance & Availability," by Tom Kimmel, 2011
As published in Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly Spring-Summer 2011, pages 40-44.
This paper seeks to address two questions:
1. Why was pre-Pearl Harbor attack intelligence important; and
2. What pre-Pearl Harbor attack intelligence was available to U. S. Intelligence, i.e., were there indications of the time, place, reason, and deceit plan to cover the attack? . . . .
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
"A Tale of Two Letters," by Tom Kimmel & Don Reed, 2011--Following the Pearl Harbor disaster, the investigative commission appointed by the Roosevelt administration pointed the finger of blame at U. S. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Naval commander in Hawaii, declaring him--along with the Army commander Major General Walter C. Short--derelict in his duty, & solely responsible for the success of the attack.
With the horror of the attack, and the obloquy from the Roberts Commission’s declaration still fresh, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox nonetheless supported Admiral Kimmel’s search for a post-retirement job with the Harris Engineering Company. Knox’s loyalty to Admiral Kimmel caused anxiety within the Navy Department, which perceived Knox’s support as a potential embarrassment to the Roosevelt Administration. Despite Secretary Knox’s noble personal gesture, the story does the Navy no credit. . . .
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
"The Last Best Missed Opportunities to Foil the Pearl Harbor and 9/11 Attacks Compared," by Tom Kimmel & J. A. Williams, Esq." 2011--The last best missed opportunities to foil the 9/11 and Pearl Harbor attacks are characterized by remarkably similar bureaucratic bungling that not only strains credulity, but remains officially ignored. Ten Pearl Harbor investigations failed to determine who was responsible for denying the best available intelligence to the Hawaiian commanders. Similarly, multiple 9/11 investigations failed to publicly determine who was responsible for denying the best available intelligence to the FBI. Why are we almost willfully obtuse in recognizing the importance of these facts?. . . .
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
"The FBI's Role in the Pearl Harbor Attack," by Tom Kimmel, J. A Williams, Esq., & Paul Glyn Williams, Esq.--Following the Pearl Harbor disaster, FDR’s investigating commission, the Roberts Commission, pointed just two fingers of blame: one at Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and the other at Lt. General Walter C. Short, the Navy and Army commanders in Hawaii. However, mounting new evidence clearly demonstrates not only that the Pearl Harbor commanders shouldered the blame unjustly but that the FBI secretly and shamelessly contributed to this result. Specifically, the FBI successfully:
(1) shielded investigation of its own failures from all Pearl Harbor investigations;
(2) acquiesced to the Commission Chairman’s perjury to Congress;
(3) secretly influenced Congress’ report to protect the FBI at the expense of the Army and Navy;
(4) secretly made false accusations against Admiral Kimmel and General Short; and
(5) conspired to withhold evidence from the Attorney General. . . .
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
"Why Did the Attack on Pearl Harbor Occur? An Intelligence Failure?" by Tom Kimmel & J. A. Williams, Esq.--On December 7, 1941 the President of the United States was asked: “How did the Japanese catch us with our pants down?” The Congress of the United States later asked: “one enigmatical and paramount question ... [w]hy was it possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur?” On December 11, 1941, the Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, thought he had the answer and sent it to the President immediately: Army and Navy Intelligence in Washington, D.C. had learned the entire Japanese attack plan days before the attack, and sent it to Admiral Kimmel, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, who did nothing about it.
Supreme Court Associate Justice Owen Roberts, Chairman of the Roberts Commission, the tribunal immediately appointed to investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster, tried but could not prove that Kimmel had this information and failed to act on it. But then Roberts put blinders on and failed to follow Mr. Hoover’s logically suggested written investigative leads in Washington, D.C., as to whether this information was available in Washington and simply not sent to Hawaii. And then later, Roberts inexplicably lied to Congress about where he got the original allegation against Kimmel. . . .
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FBI Assistant Director D.M. "Mickey" Ladd Memo to J. Edgar Hoover, dated December 11, 1941--A copy of the original document was received by the Kimmel family from the FBI under the Freedom of Information Act in 1980. The then redacted names Bissell and Burton were not made public until 2002. The memo starts:
XXXXXXXXXX [Colonel John Ter Bush Bissell, head of Army Counterintelligence in Washington, DC] today informed XXXXXXXX [FBI agent George C. Burton], in the strictest of confidence (and with the statement that if it ever got out that he had disclosed this information he would be fired), that about ten days before the attack on Pearl Harbor a number of Japanese radio intercepts had been obtained in Hawaii. When they were unable to break the code in these intercepts in Hawaii they sent them in to Washington where G2 broke them. It was found that these radio messages contained substantially the complete plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor, as it was actually carried out. The messages also contained a code Japanese word which would be sent out by radio to the Japanese fleet as the signal for the attack, when this word was repeated three times in succession. A message was sent by Army radio to the Hawaiian Islands, setting forth this entire plan for the information of the authorities in Hawaii.
On Friday morning, December 5th, the code words referred to in the previous messages as the signal for the attack were intercepted, which would have indicated that the attack was to be on either Saturday or Sunday, and this information was sent by military radio to the Hawaiian Islands. . . .
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FBI Assistant Director D. M. "Mickey" Ladd Memo to J. Edgar Hoover, dated December 11, 1941--This is a copy of the original memo as redacted in 1980. Mr. Hoover sent a paraphrased copy of the memo immeditalety to FDR, and a week later to Associate Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts. The Roberts Commission tried to prove that Admrial Kimmel had the information that Bissell described, but could not; and, then, refused to determine if Bissell's information existed in Washington and simply was not sent to Admrial Kimmel. Colonel Bissell was never called to testify about this memo as, apparently, the memo was only sent to Chairman Roberts and otherwise never disclosed to any of the ten official Pearl Harbor investigations. There is no indication in the known record that any other member of the Roberts Commission was aware of the memo.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
J. Edgar Hoover Letter to FDR, dated December 12, 1941
"About ten days prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a number of Japanese radio messages were intercepted by Military authorities in the Hawaiian Islands. Being unable to break the code in these intercepts, the messages were sent to Washington where Military Intelligence broke the code, discovered that the messages contained substantially the complete plans forthe attack on Pearl Harbor as it was subsequently carried out. The messages contained a code Japanese word which would be sent by radio to the Japanese fleet as the signal for the attack when the word was repeated three times in succession. Military authorities in Washington sent by Army radio to the Hawaiian Islands the entire plan for the information of the authorities in Hawaii. On Friday morning, December 5th, the code word previously identified as the signal for the attack was intercepted, which indicated that the attack was to be made on Saturday or Sunday, and this information was sent by Military radio to the Hawaiian Islands. At this time it is impossible to determine whether there was a breakdown in the Military radio and a failure of the messages to reach their destination, or whether the messages were delivered but not acted on by the Military authorities."
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
"General Marshall's Deception a Compilation," by Tom Kimmel--The following account of General Marshall’s three appearances as a witness before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (APHB) is excerpted and quoted entirely from General Henry Russell’s 160 page book, Pearl Harbor Story, which he wrote in 1944 and 1945, but did not publish. His heirs recognized its importance and published it in 2001. It is a remarkable firsthand account of how the APHB stumbled across the truth of the Pearl Harbor story, tried to ignore it, but could not. General Russell was a member of the APHB, along with its President General George Grunert, and General Walter Frank. The entirety of General Russell’s book is strongly recommended for anyone interested in national defense, leadership, investigations, or the rule of law. This account explains why. . . .
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Tom Kimmel Email to Donald Goldstein, dated July 2, 2007--In 1981 Professor Goldstein wrote in At Dawn We Slept, p.733:
“We agree with Forrestal ‘that [Kimmel’s] most grievous failure was his failure to conduct long-range air reconnaissance in the more dangerous sectors....aircraft . . . should have been utilized on the basis of such carefully reasoned estimates as the Martin-Bellinger and Farthing reports...”
In 1986 Professor Goldstein sharpened his criticism of Kimmel in Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History, p.441, in a chapter titled, "His [Kimmel’s] Most Grievous Failure," as follows:
“Carefully reasoned estimates, such as the Martin-Bellinger and Farthing reports, existed postulating that the most dangerous sectors were the north and northwest.”
Professor Goldstein is grievously in error as Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Carlisle Trost made clear in his letter to Secretary of the Navy John Dalton, dated October 4, 1994.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
CNO Trost letter to Secretary of the Navy John Dalton, dated October 4, 1994--[T]here were no known or predicted "more dangerous sectors" . . . in any of the official estimates provided to Admiral Kimmel prior to the attack. Furthermore, the Martin-Bellinger estimate of March 1941. . . nowhere states that the most dangerous sectors were the north and northwest. The words "north" and "northwest" do not appear in the text, nor do any equivalent nautical or numerical terms. . . . I therefore ask you. . . to reopen the case of Admiral Kimmel. I believe such action is owed to the Admiral, to his sons, and to the Navy. No mistake should be allowed to stand in this sensitive matter, and I personally disavow my unwitting support of one. . . .
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Tom Kimmel Letters to Air Force Magazine, dated December 4, 2007 & February 25, 2008--Civilian writers unfamiliar with Admiral Nimitz’s writings, who have not steered away from the pitfalls of amateur military analysis are quoted as authority in Mr. Correll’s [Air Force Magazine] article: Messrs. Prange, Goldstein, Polmar, and Lambert. All have repeatedly and inexplicably written, without apology, as Mr. Correll has that, “The Martin-Bellinger report and other analyses said the greatest vulnerability for air attack was from the north and northwest.” Please read The Martin-Bellinger report, so that this outrageous misrepresentation can be corrected. . . . I have attached copies of both the Trost letter and the Martin-Bellinger estimate. Please read them. You can find both on my website: http://www.pearlharbor911attacks.com, as well. . . .
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Martin Bellinger Joint Estimate, dated March 31 1941--No hint of a "more dangerous" sector is mentioned. What is mentioned and emphasized is this:
“Action open to us:
Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of . . . air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained . . . for a very short period . . . . and . . . cannot be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow limits of time. None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred.”
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Tom Kimmel Letter to Air Force Magazine, dated March 19, 2011--President Obama nominates General Lavelle for posthumous advancement, the Senate temporizes; the Senate recommends Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short for posthumous advancement, President Obama ignores the recommendation.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
"MAGIC and the Proximate Cause for the Disaster at Pearl Harbor," by Tom Kimmel--Tom's essay seeks to determine the proximate cause for the disaster at Pearl Harbor. MAGIC is central to this determination . . . .
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Kimmel, Short, and Pearl Harbor, The Final Report Revealed--Reviewed by Tom Kimmel--The issue is this: Should Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short, the commanders at Pearl Harbor during the attack, continue to be punitively excluded by the Navy and by the Army as the only flag and general officers, otherwise qualified, not to receive the benefit of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947--advancement to their highest temporary ranks held in World War II of admiral, and lieutenant general, respectively? The authors and dustcover promoters, except Mr. Stillwell (page 105), say yes. Giants of World War II, Nimitz, Halsey, Spruance, Kinkaid, and Burke say no. Admiral Richardson drives the point home in his counterpoint appendix. In fact, in writing, the United States Congress, the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, the Naval Academy Alumni Association, the Admiral Nimitz Foundation, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, six former Chiefs of Naval Operations, two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, one former Director of Central Intelligence, thirty-three four-star admirals (seven already mentioned), and the official historian of naval operations in World War II say no. . . .
Resolutions:
Resolution from the United States Naval Academy Class of 1966
Documents from Contributors:
As published in Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly Spring-Summer 2011, pages 35-39.
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
As published in Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly Spring-Summer 2011, pages 45 &46.
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Admiral Kimmel’s statement to the Joint Congressional Committee, January 15, 1946
This is the first opportunity I have had to speak to the representatives of the American people. I propose to give an account of my stewardship as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
My statement has four main parts.
In Part I, I shall describe the Pacific Fleet in 1941, its base at Pearl Harbor, its assigned tasks under the War Plans, its program of preparation for war, and the measures I took to provide for its readiness at sea and its security in port.
In Part II, I shall set forth the information I had prior to the attack and my conclusions and actions based upon it.
In Part III, I shall describe how the Pacific Fleet was deprived of a fighting chance to avert the disaster of December 7, 1941, because the Navy Department withheld information which indicated the probability of an attack at Pearl Harbor at the time it came.
In Part IV, I shall outline previous investigations into the Pearl Harbor catastrophe. . . .
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel's Story, 1955--Admiral Kimmel's book, plus his follow-up writing, plus a copy of House Appropriations Committee Chairman Clarence Cannon's letter to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover revealing that it was Mr. Hoover who gave his Committee the false information that Kimmel and Short were not on speaking terms at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
"Facts about Pearl Harbor" by Admiral Kimmel--Admiral Kimmel was accused from the well of the House of Representatives by Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee Clarence Cannon of "failing to prevent World War II" and the Cold War! This is Admiral Kimmel's reply.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
36 Admirals' Letter to the President of the United States--The 36 admirals include six former Chiefs of Naval Operations, two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and one former Director of Central Intelligence. Their letter starts,
"As part of the observances of the 50th Anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, it is fitting that our country rectify a regrettable injustice which has prevailed since that time. We refer to the unjust assignment of sole blame for the tragic attack to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN, Commander-In-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, USA, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Hawaii, and the resulting cruel stigma and humiliation to these officers and their families for the past 50 years . . . .
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
"Critical Analysis of the Dorn Report" by Vice Admiral David Charles Richardson, USN (RET.)--The former Commander of the 6th Fleet, and Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet writes:
"Despite the pledge by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to 'examine the matter without preconceptions so that a judgment can be reached on the basis of fact and fairness,' it is obvious that the Dorn Report relies instead primarily on information contained in earlier hearings and inquiries that were designed to deflect criticism from Washington. Statements and accusations that we now know are inaccurate, or false, that appeared in the congressional inquiry reappear in the Dorn Report, and are included with comment . . . .
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Col. Petkoff's letter to A/Secretary of the Army Pete Geren RE: General Short and the Army Board for Correction of Military Records, dated April 9, 2007
"Having read the record of proceedings, I am troubled by the decision of the Deputy Assistant Secretary wherein he rejected the Board’s decision without making alternative findings of fact, thus opening his action to a contention that it was arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence and otherwise contrary to law. To prevail under 10 USC 1552 the statute requires a finding by the board of an error or an injustice. In General Short’s case the Board specifically stated: “While the Board unanimously found no error in this case, the majority found evidence of injustice.” The action of the Deputy Assistant Secretary without providing additional evidentiary facts and reasons therefore, simply adopted the view of the minority that there was no injustice. This strongly appears to be arbitrary and capricious treatment of Major General Short’s case and makes it worthy of reconsideration. . . .
After all these years of controversy since the attack on Pearl Harbor, shouldn’t this admitted injustice finally be recognized as such, and Major General Short’s records corrected?"
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
George Victor, The Pearl Harbor Myth, Reviewed by Admiral Tom Brooks--Former Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence Admiral Tom Brooks wrote that,
“Chief of Staff Marshall, Chief of Naval Operations Stark, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, and Secretary of State Hull, among others—[tried] to cover up their mistakes with regard to the Pearl Harbor attack, and to fix the blame on the Hawaii commanders at the time of attack . . . [S]enior Army and Navy officials committed perjury, suborned perjury, destroyed evidence, and intimidated witnesses. Testimony during the nine investigations . . . presents a sordid picture of Washington officials covering themselves at the expense of the two Pearl Harbor commanders. Kimmel and Short[’s] . . . seniors in Washington shared culpability and acted in a disgraceful fashion in their attempt to deflect all the blame. For this reason alone, a compelling case can be made to restore Kimmel and Short to their pre-war ranks. . . . (Proceedings, May 2007, Admiral Brooks’ review of The Pearl Harbor Myth, p.170).”
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Admiral Mac Showers "The War in the Navy," 2011--Admiral Mac Showers saw Naval intelligence firsthand for almost the entire War. No one alive knows more about the problems encountered at Pearl Harbor and why. Included are excerpts from an interview of Rear Admiral Donald “Mac” Showers by Vic Socotra as printed in a Special 25th Anniversary Issue of the Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 1985-2010:
"CDR Joe Rochefort had a sign behind his desk at Station Hypo:
'There's no limit to what you can accomplish, so long as you don't care who gets the credit!'
"That was not true for others in the Pacific. Not the Redman Brothers, certainly, but at least their mendacity is understandable. They were not running the show when the deal went down.
"If you want the man most responsible for the successful Japanese attack, you should not throw a pebble on the grave of poor Husband Kimmel . . . .
Professor Emeritus University of Florida Michael Gannon Papers
Professor Gannon's Remarks at the National Press Club in Washington, DC, November 6, 2003
"In reply to the Kimmel family's petition to the Secretary of Defense for restoration of Admiral Kimmel's honorable standing on the Navy's Retired List, Under Secretary David S.C. Chu stated on July 16, 2002 that no new "extraordinary evidence" had surfaced to support the petition. In fact, much new evidence of an extraordinary character has been uncovered of late by historian-researchers. President Harry S. Truman once said; "The only thing new in this world is the history you don't know." Of the many recent findings by historians here are three of the most significant. . . .
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Professor Gannon on Pacific Fleet Readiness
". . . . What was interesting to me about the change of command was my recent discovery in the Kimmel papers at the University of Wyoming of a communication from Nimitz at Pearl to the new Commander-in-Chief United States Navy Admiral Ernest J. King at Washington, dated January 7, 1942, in which Nimitz stated his conviction that the Japanese carriers would return for a second air strike, perhaps more. 'The attack of 7 December will be followed by others,' he wrote King. What was even more interesting was that, in the face of such immediate expectations, Nimitz maintained the same state of readiness that Kimmel had in place on December 7th. Indeed, Nimitz re-issued without change Kimmel's Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter on port security, No. 2CL-41, entitled 'Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas,' dated 14 October 1942.
That letter called for Condition III. Condition I, which was General Quarters with all guns manned on maximum alert, could not be sustained for longer than twelve hours. We remember that, on August 8, 1942 at Savo Island, the U.S. Navy lost four heavy cruisers in a night battle to a Japanese force because the ships' crews were exhausted from being kept at maximum alert for sixteen hours without rest.
The 2CL-41 letter with Kimmel's name on it was re-issued by Nimitz without change as to watches and conditions of readiness, and it remained in force throughout 1942. I mention this because the critic who would skewer Kimmel on his state of readiness must be prepared to take on Admiral Nimitz as well."
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Professor Gannon, "Reopen the Kimmel Case"--"The allegation that Admiral Husband E. Kimmel knew of and ignored advice regarding the direction and extent to which he should have ordered long-range air reconnaissance prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor is false – and grounds to set it right exist. . . .
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Professor Gannon on Shallow-Water Torpedoes
"The most extensive damage received by the Pacific Fleet's capital ships on December 7th was inflicted by aerial dropped torpedoes. . . . The water depth at Pearl Harbor was 30 feet, except in the channels, where it was 45 feet. The successful British aerial torpedo attacks at Taranto, Italy, on 12 November 1940 had been made in depths of 84 to 90 feet, with a few runs made at 66 to 72 feet depths. . . .
[M]y research in Naval Attaché reports from London--documents in the National Archives at College Park, MD, that stand outside the usually consulted Pearl Harbor collection--reveal that [CNO] Stark's operations people knew in July 1941 that the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm had made a fin modification to its 18-inch Mark XII aerial torpedo that enabled it to be dropped in water as shallow as 24 feet. Use of the shallow water torpedo had been made in Royal Navy air attacks on various Italian harbors in the Mediterranean during 1940 and the first month of 1941.
This was extraordinary new information: namely, that shallow water torpedoes were possible, that they existed, and, what was more, that they had been proved effective in battle. This knowledge, which was in the hands of the Navy Department five months before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, was withheld from Admiral Kimmel. . . .
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Professor Gannon on Kimmel's Aerial Reconnaissance Decision
". . . . [T]he U.S. Navy war plan WPPac-46 required that the patrol plane force on Oahu advance in "maximum practicable strength" prior to W-Day plus 5 to Wake, Midway, and Johnston Islands, as part of the Marshall Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan. As Kimmel's war plans officer Captain Charles H. 'Soc' McMorris expressed it, '. . . . If we were called upon to conduct a war, [then] we would find a large proportion of our planes needing engine overhaul at the time we most required their services.' For that reason, and also because WPPac-46 mandated distant aerial reconnaissance only from W-Day forward, Kimmel decided to concentrate his aircraft on expansion training until more aircraft, or more information, became available. As Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, senior Navy air commander in Hawaii, said: 'Any Admiral worth his stars would have made the same choice.' Indeed, Kimmel's replacement as CINCPAC Admiral Chester W. Nimitz stated in 1960: 'Admiral Kimmel had been given no information which would justify interrupting a very urgent training schedule.'"