

**A Critical Analysis of the Report by the Department of
Defense Dated December 1, 1995, Regarding Advancement
of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Major General
Walter C. Short on the Retired List**

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Introduction

Acting on the request of the surviving sons of Admiral Kimmel, Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee, held a meeting in the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing Room on April 27th, 1995 to permit the Kimmel family to present to the Secretary of Defense reasons why their father, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, should have his four star rank restored to him posthumously. Senator Strom Thurmond conducted the meeting. Representing the Department of Defense were the Deputy Secretary of Defense John M. Deutch, Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton and Navy General Counsel Steven S. Honigman. Those present in support of the Kimmel family were former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer; former Chief of Naval Operations, James L. Holloway III; Admiral Harold E. Shear, Rear Admiral Donald M. Showers, Captain Edward L. Beach, author, John Costello, historian; Michael Gannon, historian; Mr. Anthony DeLorenzo, representing the Pearl Harbor Survivor's Association; Counsel for Admiral Kimmel, Edward Hanify; the sons of Admiral Kimmel, Edward R. and Captain Thomas K., Edward's son, Manning M. IV and Thomas's son Thomas K., Jr. Navy General Counsel Honigman presented the case against posthumous advancement. The attendees accompanying the Kimmel family spoke in favor of advancement. The Kimmel family spoke in favor of General Short. The outcome was a pledge by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to Senator Thurmond to review the matter of posthumous advancement objectively, and make a report. A transcription of remarks made in the meeting is

attached as Exhibit A. The report by the Under Secretary of Defense, dated December 1, 1995, (the Dorn Report) is appended as exhibit B. The executive summary of the Dorn Report is exhibit C.

Shortly after the meeting in a letter to Senator Strom Thurmond dated 10 May, 1995, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Deutch, stated:

As I pledged at the meeting, we will examine the matter without preconceptions so that a judgment can be reached on the basis of fact and fairness and the right action can be taken without delay. Like you, we seek to arrive at a closure that will be recognized as principled and fair.

Comment: In order to arrive "at a closure that will be recognized as principled and fair" Secretary Deutch's pledge "that a judgment can be reached on the basis of fact and fairness" is a pledge to identify what the errors in judgment were and when and by whom they were committed. To what extent did errors in judgment that occurred at seat of government impact on judgment errors that may have occurred in Hawaii? More specifically, were those that may have been committed by Kimmel and Short of a severity to affect in any significant way the outcome of the surprise attack, or warrant destruction of their reputations?

This paper will reexamine the events and related information that we now know was then available in Washington and in Honolulu, present an assessment of their significance when viewed in an operational context, and identify errors in judgment by the parties to that disaster. An additional purpose is to provide for the record information not previously known, or, for whatever reasons, not permitted to be included in the several inquiries. The intent is creation of a contextual record of fundamental considerations that should apply in force commander relationships as revealed by errors committed in the days, weeks and months prior to Pearl Harbor in order that we not suffer needless losses in lives in future perilous situations.

In the Dorn Report, an administration acknowledges for the first time that blame for Pearl Harbor does not rest solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Others were also to blame. The others remain unidentified, their blame unexplained. The Dorn Report asserts that although neither commander is guilty of "dereliction of duty," as initially asserted in the Robert's Commission Report, both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were guilty of faulty judgment. They must therefore continue to bear blame for the disaster. But then, the

Report notes, military commanders serve at the pleasure of senior command and may be relieved for no reason other than a loss of faith in their judgment. For this reason alone, the Report states, posthumous advancement of Kimmel and Short is inappropriate. The point is made that since the Pearl Harbor commanders' retirement in their permanent ranks are facts of history, violate no laws and are in accord with common practice they should stand.

It is, indeed, true, that military commanders serve at the pleasure of senior command. They may be relieved for any number of reasons. But we have here a major disaster, with enormous military and political consequences, and an issue of historical significance regarding which we need to set the record straight in order to not repeat past mistakes. The Dorn Report also notes the scope and depth of national criticism directed particularly at Admiral Kimmel. It makes clear that Kimmel's relief in particular was driven by considerations other than loss of confidence in his Judgment. In this regard the Report states;

It is important to remember that the state of the allied cause in both the Atlantic and Pacific was extremely perilous in the dark days of early 1942. The greatest national need at the time was to prosecute the global war against both Germany and Japan.

Comment: The implication is clear. The nation's leaders at that critical juncture quite rightly feared the loss of confidence that would follow an admission that Washington authorities were in some degree at fault, an admission that in the context of the then existing military situation would have been irresponsible. Nor for several weeks did the extent of blame attributable to the mishandling of intelligence become increasingly apparent to those knowledgeable of the contents of that intelligence. There were needs to both preserve the secrecy of our code breaking successes and our national political stability.

The public mood in the aftermath of the disaster was bitter, frightened. How could this happen? The view of the general public was that laxity and inattention by Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short had left the American fleet vulnerable. The public perception of life in Hawaii contributed to this suspicion. The reality was quite different, apparent to those of us who served there during 1940-41. As the war progressed, with victory clearly in sight, military reasons for blaming Kimmel and Short ceased to exist. But political reasons remained. Requests for posthumous advancement in rank of the Hawaiian commanders have been interpreted by some as an attack against the reputation of President Roosevelt. Is this consideration valid? While other injustices of that time have since been rectified, as for example, restitution made to Japanese Americans who were

incarcerated in encampments during the war, the injustice done Kimmel and Short remains un-admitted. If then in the national interest to shoulder the Pearl Harbor commanders with the blame, does that interest apply today? Given that the attack was a Japanese initiative, and by any known measures American intervention a prerequisite to Hitler's defeat, is there a valid basis today for reasoning that the reputation of President Roosevelt would be tarnished by an admission that blame for the damage inflicted lay in Washington? The circumstances then existing saw Great Britain, its army devastated in its retreat to and recovery from Dunkirk, fighting alone for survival against Hitler, Mussolini, Japan and, until the spring of 1941, Stalin's Soviet Union in uneasy alliance with Hitler.

Recorded history accurately notes the all out effort by President Roosevelt, supported by his key advisors, to assist Britain and, later, the Soviet Union in their defense against Hitler's aggression. The American public, on the other hand, was seemingly determined to avoid involvement, certainly not in a combat role. The President first initiated a buildup of our military strength and an increasing supply of military equipment to Britain. After Hitler's assault on the Soviet Union, and evidence that Stalin might succeed in his defensive efforts, Roosevelt initiated economic constraints designed to hold Japan in check to permit the Red Army to transfer military forces from Eastern Siberia for defense of Moscow. These constraints created conditions that the Japanese deemed unbearable. To the Japanese way of thinking, allied as they were to Hitler, achieving the Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere and its promise of economic freedom made war with America a necessity. On the other hand, the President knew that if America went to war, that could only occur if America were first attacked. Now this had come to pass. A well planned, superbly executed attack by six Japanese aircraft carriers stunned America and the world by the severity of damage the attacks achieved. In these circumstances an undermined national leadership would exacerbate an already dangerous situation. The course of action to be taken was clear and simple. Let Kimmel and Short shoulder the blame. This came naturally from pre-war mindsets and political self interest. Nor was it then clear that they weren't to blame.

Vice Admiral Frank E Beatty, USN (ret.), Aide to the late Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, in an interview by *U. S. News and World Report*, May 28, 1954, page 50, (enclosure X) states:

I can say that prior to December 7th it was evident even to me, as I was reading the "magic" messages, that we were pushing Japan into a corner. I believe that it was the desire of President Roosevelt and of Prime Minister Churchill that we get into the war as they felt the allies could not win

without us, and all our efforts to cause the Germans to declare war on us had failed. The conditions we imposed on Japan—to get out of China, for example—were so severe that we knew that nation could not accept. We did not want her to accept them. We were forcing her so severely that we should have known that she would react toward the United States. All her preparations in a military way—and we knew their overall import—pointed that way.

Although Admiral Beatty did not believe that Roosevelt knew of the impending attack, there is considerable evidence to the contrary. It is not conclusive, but not all the pertinent information has yet been released into the public domain. The evidence now known will be summarized. However, the matter of achieving justice for Kimmel and Short does not depend on any information beyond that now known. The known evidence is adequate.

Dorn Report Major Deficiencies

The Dorn Report findings are:

1. Responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; it should be broadly shared.
2. To say that responsibility is broadly shared is not to absolve Admiral Kimmel and General Short of accountability.
3. The official treatment of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was substantially temperate and procedurally proper.
4. History has not been hostile to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
5. There is not a compelling basis for advancing either officer to a higher grade.

While this presentation is directed at deficiencies in the Dorn Report, it is only fair and proper to point out that the Report, while lacking comprehension in some salient features of military operational life, is nevertheless exceptional in its objectivity. While it has failed to include some highly pertinent and significant information that more thorough research would have revealed, we are nevertheless especially indebted for a presentation that permits a point counterpoint treatment of the case for posthumous advancement in rank for the two Pearl Harbor commanders. The Dorn Report is commendable also for recognizing that this subject cannot yet be put to rest. It states:

On the other hand, sober analysis in the years since the publication of the joint Congressional Committee's Report has produced a number of works of nuanced and balanced scholarship which constitutes the beginnings of

the verdict of history. Those works, based on a careful reading of the entire record of the joint Congressional Committee and of other primary sources that have come to light in the intervening years, are creating a responsible and increasingly accurate and just understanding of the tapestry of failure at Pearl Harbor. Ultimately, in a free society this must be the function of the academic community, and it is one that the academic community is performing well in this case.

Comment: An "increasingly accurate and just understanding" of the disaster's causes depends upon recognition of the essentiality of continuous intelligence inputs for effective command functioning and of the mutuality of command responsibility, one commander to another, in the command chain. As we shall see, Secretary Dorn reflects the general inability of non-professionals to distinguish between strategic intelligence, or statements of general warning applicable across a span of time, and tactical intelligence which provides minute-by-minute, hour-by-hour information updates that indicate change in the likelihood of a specific event occurring. This facet of the problem was clearly not understood in preparation of the Dorn Report.

Only recently has the general public learned from "other primary sources" the extraordinarily valuable information derived from code breaking that inferred both time and place of the forthcoming attack. The importance of this information to Admiral Kimmel and General Short, but not provided to them, as we shall see, was not comprehended in preparation of the Dorn Report. There are other basic faults. Given the risks being taken, both political and military, the President thought it expedient to take a more direct control of fleet operations. Dorn failed to take into account the added responsibility incurred by Washington as a consequence of that assumption of authority. More importantly, Dorn failed to recognize the essential relationship that must exist between conduct of foreign policy and employment of military force if we are to avoid disastrous consequences. The Report's rationale with regard to important realities that guide and constrain force commanders in their conduct of operations is seriously flawed. Finally, in an assessment of fault, one must examine the operational options that were available to Kimmel and Short before the attack, and whether or not the arrangements that they made in the context of the information available to them reflected either bad judgment or omissions. That was not done.

Although we now have in the public domain much of the information available in Washington, but not in Hawaii, there remains one possibly crucial bit of evidence not yet

released—the secure telephone conversation in which Churchill called Roosevelt early in the morning of 26 November, 1941, that may be central to the radical and sudden change in Roosevelt's attitude toward the then ongoing negotiations with Japan. Information from Secretary Stimson concerning Japanese troop movements to the south most likely accounts for the war warning message sent Kimmel and Short November 27th. The coincidence of timing suggests this Churchill/Roosevelt conversation may also have played a role. Be that as it may, the case for restoring the reputations of Admiral Kimmel and General Short does not depend upon the content of that conversation.

We Must Understand Some Basic Premises and Fundamental Operational Realities

The commander assigning a mission to a subordinate commander is obligated to assign forces required for mission accomplishment. If force availability is deemed inadequate, the mission should be modified. The practice, and reality, in peacetime is that a force presence signifies intent, or will. Relatively small forces placed in harms way, when backed by clearly discernable national will, enjoy a degree of security and exercise influence beyond that inherent in the force itself. This can create a dangerous situation, however, when basic national interests are at issue, as was then the case with respect to Japan who imported 90% of its oil from the United States.

Admiral Kimmel's forces were inferior to those available to the Japanese, substantially so. His predecessor, Admiral J. O. Richardson, was relieved of his command because of his unwillingness to keep the fleet stationed in Pearl Harbor because of its vulnerability to surprise attack. Even so, several months after replacing Richardson with Kimmel, the President reduced Pacific Fleet forces a further 25 % by transferring an aircraft carrier, three battleships, cruisers, destroyers and support ships to the Atlantic. Our President's strategy centered on providing all possible aid to Britain, including warship patrols in the western Atlantic. Since our military buildup was then in early stages, the President accepted the additional risk in the Pacific inherent in the transfer of major forces to the Atlantic.

Military events in the fall of 1941 caused the President to modify his strategy. The German Army was notably successful initially in its invasion of the Soviet Union. The President foresaw a need to transfer Russian forces stationed in the Far East westward to assist in defense of Stalingrad and Moscow. To offset the possibility that Japan might attack a weakened Russian rear, he directed a strengthening of Army and Army Air Force forces in the Philippine Islands, diverting some forces

otherwise destined for Britain. The B-17 bombers arriving Hickam Field, Oahu, the morning of December 7th were en route the Philippines. These force movements themselves involved considerable chance taking by our national high command, since they could precipitate hostilities in the circumstances. No problem with that. The point is simply that in event of a miscalculation, a reverse or a defeat, a substantial amount of responsibility resides with the political and military leadership at the seat of government, since only that authority can orchestrate the necessary political and military interactions to reduce risks. If a miscalculation occurs, and for various (and good) reasons an admission of responsibility is unacceptable at the time of a disaster, acceptance is an obligation when those reasons no longer apply. The Dorn report took no account of the effect of force inferiority, especially in air power, and its constraints on the operational options or initiatives that Kimmel could take. Dorn did not acknowledge that American policies and actions emphasizing support of Chungking and protection of the Soviet Union eastern provinces together with constraints on exports of oil served a strategic purpose, and were deciding factors in Japan's decision to initiate war with a surprise attack on the Pacific Fleet.

Admiral Kimmel was concerned at the weakened condition of his forces. He protested the transfer of the three battleships and the aircraft carrier *Yorktown* Battle Group to the Atlantic. Particularly significant was the loss of the *Yorktown*, as it left the Japanese navy with six large operational aircraft carriers a sizeable advantage in air strike power. Only three remained to Kimmel, the early carriers *Lexington* and *Saratoga*, and the more modern *Enterprise*. Implicit in this transfer of forces was the degree of faith, existing in Washington, misplaced as we later learned, that Japan would not attack the Hawaiian Islands. Adoption by the administration soon thereafter of hard-line policies toward the Japanese, as events soon proved, placed the Hawaiian commanders in untenable positions. A commitment further complicating if not potentially compromising the President's domestic political situation, was his promise to the British and Dutch to come to their aid in the event the Japanese initiated attack against their territories in the South Pacific. These actions were either miscalculations in Washington regarding the relative strengths of naval forces in the Pacific, a misplaced faith that the Japanese would not attack in Hawaii, or the President was willing to accept the risk of a Japanese attack somewhere in the Pacific.

I repeat for emphasis—the transfer of three battleships and an aircraft carrier to the Atlantic in the spring of 1941 left the Pacific fleet appreciably weaker than the Japanese fleet, especially in the all important carrier air strike aircraft category.

This transfer severely constrained Kimmel's force employment options from that date forward.

The Role of Intelligence in the Application of Military Force

In all the books I have read about the disaster I find a common deficiency—they do not reflect an understanding of the essential interaction between fleet activity and operational intelligence. This is a major weakness in the Dorn Report as well. Even in And I Was There that interaction is taken for granted. It is not explained. The reason is that assessing the significance of intelligence, then exploiting it, is a commander's responsibility, as is targeting of intelligence collection resources. The continuous presentation of intelligence, on the one hand, and exploiting it by redirecting ongoing fleet activity, on the other, makes clear that an extraordinary intimacy must exist between operations and intelligence. Smart command decisions depend upon a flow of good, timely intelligence information.

One must understand the command need for a continuous accumulation of information from many sources for creation of a font of knowledge that enhances command ability to function effectively. Within that information flow there is a category of time sensitive, operationally significant information (called *opintel*) that is pertinent to one's own situation and status at points in time. This "coin" has two sides: what one currently knows about a possible threat, and what one wants or needs to know, but doesn't. New information is continuously assessed in the light of other related information. A continuous appraisal is made of evolving situations in light of one's own activity as well as in the context of political developments and military activity elsewhere. The objective is to identify what to do in time so as to not lose control over evolving events, the imminence of which may be measured in minutes and hours. Often, information seemingly benign to recipients elsewhere, is viewed as quite significant when weighed in the context of other related information locally available and one's own activity at the time. For example: A submarine sighting near a port is interesting. If warships are about to depart, it is worrisome. In applying this process force commanders seek to control adversity by modifying ongoing operational activity to counter new developments. The demands of this process are why Admiral Kimmel held a meeting of key staff personnel at 3:00 PM, Saturday, December 6th, and asked the question about Japanese aircraft carrier locations that most authors mention.

A military historian whose name I have forgotten wrote that battles are won by commanders who make fewer mistakes. Mistakes occur when foresight is inadequate. At all points in

time evolving military situations are characterized by uncertainty. Knowledge is imperfect. Seemingly minor occurrences are often seen in retrospect to have set in motion a sequence of events that heavily influenced the outcome. The antidote to uncertainty is knowledge. Clearly, and importantly, Admiral Kimmel's 3:00 PM meeting that Saturday afternoon, December 6th, was in search of more perfect knowledge of the current situation, revealed by his comment about the location of the Japanese aircraft carriers. The story then unfolding in Washington, viewed in the context of intelligence from code-breaking during the previous several weeks, clearly foretold the likelihood of air attack against the fleet in Pearl Harbor that Sunday morning. But all of that information was withheld from Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

The central weakness of the Dorn Report is its failure to understand the necessary intelligence/operational intimacy, and the potential consequences when lacking. Items two to ten, pages III-7 to III-11, inclusive, provide accurately what was known to Kimmel and Short. It does not identify operationally significant, time sensitive intelligence known in Washington, but not sent to Hawaii, that indicated both time and place of likely attack. Nor does it take into account the responsibilities of the Director of Naval Intelligence to ascertain and advise regarding possible enemy functional capabilities. Two quotes from the Dorn Report highlight this weakness.

Despite this mass of evidence, the practical difficulties of conducting an aerial attack may have caused Admiral Kimmel and General Short to minimize its likelihood (page III-10).

Comment: The practical difficulties referred to in this first quote, and the failure of naval intelligence to accurately assess the likely effectiveness of Japanese naval men and materials did, indeed, create an opinion that an air attack against Pearl Harbor might be damaging but not disastrous. This failure is attributable to the Director, Naval Intelligence, in Washington. As to the views of Kimmel and Short, any force commander is determined to defeat any attack, whether major or minor. The record is replete with information that neither Kimmel nor Short minimized the likelihood of an air attack. As to the "mass of evidence," the evidence that was valid, timely and precise remained in Washington in intelligence withheld, as we shall soon see.

There is no evidence that any military officer, Army or Navy, minimized the likelihood of a surprise air attack against Oahu. Throughout the 30's major fleet exercises drove that point home, and were the basis for the requirement for 120 B-17s for General Short (12 provided) and 100 naval patrol planes (none

provided) for the Commandant, 14th Naval District. There is implied evidence that our civilian leadership in Washington minimized that likelihood in establishing national political and military priorities. All shared the belief that such an attack would have limited success. For example, of the two air weapons, torpedoes and bombs, and general recognition that torpedoes had the greater potential for damage where they could be used, that specific threat was dismissed. In response to Secretary of the Navy Knox's concern regarding a torpedo attack similar to that delivered against the Italian Navy, noting the greater depth of water in the south of Italy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, in Washington in early 1941 provided detailed technical advice to the Pacific Fleet and the Commandant, 14th Naval District as follows:

Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T (anti-torpedo) baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo attack. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of the water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition, the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles—a minimum depth of water of 75' may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes—150' of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250'. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. The desirable height for dropping is 60' or less. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed but this may be altered.

Given the dimensions of water in Pearl Harbor, with depths less than 40', it was Washington's assessment that discounted that danger. Nor was there capability in Hawaii to remedy that deficiency if Kimmel had reason to think otherwise.

The second Dorn Report quote states:

This exclusive reliance on Washington for both tactical and strategic warning is at the heart of the failure at Pearl Harbor, and of the debate about the failure. The record suggests that officials in Washington believed they had provided strategic warning with their messages of November 27th; neither Admiral Kimmel nor General Short read the messages that way. The debate over the handling of Japan's 14-part message on December 6th and the morning of December 7th is about tactical warning. Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not get tactical warning.

Comment: This quote captures succinctly the single most significant area of disagreement in allocating blame for the disaster and does, indeed, go to the very heart of the problem. If, in fact, it is true that Washington thought its responsibilities discharged by this last of several strategic

warning messages, then we have an example of an egregious degree of ignorance by senior naval professionals that is hard to believe, hard to attribute to bureaucratic bungling, especially given the letter Admiral Kimmel gave Admiral Stark in June, 1941. The earlier assumption of authority by the Director of War Plans over distribution of intelligence, then his subsequent failure to assure that this intelligence went out was a most grievous error the net effect of which was to mislead Admiral Kimmel, and directly affect his assessment of the situation in the days and hours preceding the attack.

A more reasonable explanation for assertions that providing "strategic" warning was adequate is that it served the political purpose of diverting criticism. As to the Dorn Report, this quote also assumes adequacy of patrol plane resources and other long range surveillance means that simply were not available to Kimmel or to Short, but which means were, in fact, available from code-breaking in Washington. This quote drives home the point that Dorn has no understanding of the role of tactical intelligence in the operational decision process, which lack has also appeared in a number of books written about Pearl Harbor. As will be noted, Admiral King stated a misuse by Admiral Kimmel of his patrol plane resources in his endorsement opposing the findings in the report by the Navy Court of Inquiry. That criticism provided a convenient device to avoid a public relations debacle while the war was still in progress. It was also an endorsement Admiral King later retracted. See Exhibit K.

No one has stated the case better for complete and timely support by Washington regarding policy and intelligence updates than Admiral Kimmel himself. Having been informed by Vice Admiral Wilson Brown in February, 1941, that there was "confusion" in Washington regarding responsibilities for keeping him advised regarding intelligence, and having received in personal letters from Admiral Stark information that could have come only from code breaking of Japanese message traffic, Admiral Kimmel handed the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, a letter during his visit in Washington in June, 1941, that contained the following:

The Commander-in Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters

radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition that directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid development in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

Several years later, after Admiral Kimmel had learned of all the information held in Washington that could, and should, have been provided him, he wrote:

The Navy Department thus engaged in a course of conduct which definitely gave me the impression that intelligence from important intercepted Japanese messages was being furnished to me. Under these circumstances a failure to send me important information of this character was not merely a withholding of intelligence. It amounted to an affirmative misrepresentation This failure not only deprived me of essential facts. It misled me.

The stage for the disaster was set in April, 1941, by the Director of War Plans when he took control of distribution of

any intelligence that might prompt a fleet commander to move forces. He did this with the concurrence of the Chief of Naval Operations. It must be noted that this new arrangement was without precedent. It represented a change in a procedure that was doctrinal in nature. Nor was any explanation of the change, or of the reasons therefore, made known to the fleet commanders. The then subsequent failure to keep Kimmel properly informed of obviously important intelligence was an error in judgment of major proportion. This decision increased enormously the responsibility of authorities in Washington for any consequent disaster if, as happened, the flow of essential information ceased. The record is clear that very significant information from code-breaking, essential to a proper exercise of command, was denied Kimmel and Short.

Commanders of forces then and now have no choice but to rely on Washington for wide area surveillance. During WW1 "radio intelligence" first exploited enemy use of radio transmissions for their control of forces. This exploitation included code-breaking, which also had great political import, so collection, analysis, security protection and prioritization became located at seats of government. Dissemination of information thus derived became the responsibility of top level military authority. Since a commander can only make sense in his force employment if he possesses related intelligence, top commands at seats of government took on a shared responsibility for force effectiveness and security. As noted above, this obligation was ignored by the Director of War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations in the months preceding Pearl Harbor. Kimmel and Short were denied, despite their many complaints, information they needed to properly employ their forces.

With regard to Kimmel's state of mind, note that when the carriers *Lexington* and *Enterprise* departed Pearl Harbor in the days preceding the Japanese attack with reinforcements for Wake and Midway, Halsey placed his forces on a full wartime basis, with authority to shoot. Every senior force commander knows that a direction of this sort is done only with the compliance, or by direction, of the next higher authority. No complacency there! No indication there of an unlikelihood of attack mentality!

The Dorn Report criticized Admiral Kimmel for not using his cruiser based amphibious aircraft to augment his search coverage. Consider the search problem. To reach the Japanese air strike launch point 275 miles from Pearl Harbor at daybreak, December 7th, the attacking group would be about 550 miles at sunset, December 6th, and 800 miles at sunrise, December 6th. Presumably cruiser searches would have

started November 27th. There were few cruisers, their search capabilities very limited. This would have presented severe logistical problems, and logistics support was very limited, an impediment already to even sustained local operations. The comment does reveal the lack of depth of inquiry into the limitations that constrained fleet operational activity represented by the researchers and preparers of the Dorn Report.

Dorn's assertion that exclusive reliance on Washington for tactical warning was at the heart of the failure at Pearl Harbor assumes adequacy of reconnaissance resources when their availability was but a small fraction of the requirement. To criticize the admiral for not using his cruiser aircraft for long range search is reaching for straws.

As to the likelihood of a Japanese air attack against Pearl Harbor, as distinct from its expected effectiveness, throughout 1940 and until departure of *Yorktown* in April, 1941, as a fighter pilot in VF-5, the *Yorktown* fighter squadron, I personally flew dawn and dusk patrols against that possibility of an air attack whenever the ship was in Pearl Harbor. There was never any lack of "strategic warning" in the sense used in the Report, nor of awareness of the possibility of a surprise air attack. An attribution otherwise is uninformed and unwarranted. This failure, of course, presumes a degree of ignorance of the intelligence process at top levels of navy command in Washington that may not be true. There may be another explanation, one having to do with the degree to which direct control of fleet operational activity in both oceans was being exercised by Washington. Given the course of international developments on the one hand, and domestic political determination to avoid involvement in the conflict on the other, the Director of War Plans action is understandable. What is not understandable is his failure to then discharge the responsibilities he so eagerly sought. The subsequent severity of the Pearl Harbor attack made it indiscreet to admit this confused state of affairs. The Dorn Report neither recognizes nor admits to this.

A long time, common practice, one that was increased in numbers of units involved in the weeks before the disaster, was protection from submarine attack while warships egress or ingress Pearl Harbor. Detection equipment in those days was technically weak, especially

as to reliability of identity of contacts. As a result, more whales than submarines were reported as submarines and destroyed in the early days of the war.

There is another facet to the problem of balancing risk versus maintenance and training, in which dependence is placed on incoming intelligence. One must understand that deployed naval forces are fully occupied 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in numerous "housekeeping" chores, including maintenance, and training in pursuit of mission assignment. Nor must command neglect the mental and physical needs of personnel that include athletics and recreation after periods at sea. A command, thusly, is always engaged in more or less essential activity, defined in operating schedules, from which one departs as made necessary by incoming intelligence or direction from above. A commander of deployed forces is continuously and directly involved in assessing the significance of incoming information to the end that "harmful" disruptions of ongoing activity within the force occur as seldom as a changing situation warrants or avoidance of surprise mandates. We all know the loss of confidence in command that attends "cry wolf" nervous Nellies. We who served in warships moored in Pearl Harbor in the late thirties before air conditioning came along also know why ships were not buttoned up to resist until evidence existed of a high probability of an attack. In sum, incoming intelligence triggers operational initiatives in a dynamic process on a twenty-four hour, seven days a week basis. The Secretary of the Navy message providing strategic warning simply acknowledged something Pacific fleet commanders had known for several years. For that matter, so did I.

So, what was known in Washington that Kimmel needed to know, but didn't? Here follows information known in Washington, but not sent Hawaii, from October 9 to December 7, 1941. Some of it highlight Japanese interest in detailed information regarding ships in Pearl Harbor. That information can be compared for completeness with that presented in the Dorn Report (page III-18).

- Dorn cites the "bomb plot" message, translated October 9th, as available in Washington but not in Hawaii. Dorn makes no further reference to this important indicator of interest in detailed information needed by Japan to plan air assaults against ships in port there. Nor does Dorn mention other related information held in Washington. The first such evidence originated with "Tricycle," a German double agent. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) informed Navy of Japanese interest in harbor details and warship locations in Pearl Harbor. Navy responded with information then passed

to "Tricycle" by the FBI to preserve his credentials as a spy working for the Axis powers. Kimmel was not informed of any of this information exchange. Details are provided in Exhibit D.

Comment: The "bomb plot" message was sent September 24th, 1941 to the Japanese consul-general in Honolulu. It divided Pearl Harbor into five areas, and specified that reports were to be made regarding identity of ships within each area, including those at anchor, those that were moored and those moored alongside others. This information was of a specificity that made plain its purpose—planning for an air attack! When Admiral Kimmel learned of this message years later, he remarked to his family that with this knowledge, given his limited force availabilities, he would have been much more forceful in his dealings with the Navy Department.

- November 15th J-19 code # 111 (translated 12/3) Tokyo to Honolulu states as relations between Japan and the United States most critical make ships in harbor report irregularly at least twice weekly.
- November 18th J-19 code #113 (translated 12/5) Tokyo to Honolulu Special report on ship locations requested.
- November 18th J-19 code #222 (translated 12/6) Honolulu to Tokyo Reports additional ship locations
- November 29th J-19 (Navy translated 12/5) Tokyo to Honolulu We are getting your ship movement reports. Now report even when ships not moving.

See Exhibit E for text of decoded messages revealing sustained and detailed interest in Pearl Harbor, and the identity and location of major warships when moored in the harbor. Their timing in relation to the "purple" diplomatic traffic increases their significance, a point also missed by the preparers of the Dorn Report. In this regard, a factor in assessing the significance of information contained in any intercept is the review of earlier, related information and consideration of other activity that is ongoing in the same time frame as the intercept being read. This observation of a thought process is so obvious that it is a given that Washington based analysts using the intelligence intercepts then available were doing just that. It is in this context that

the most significant of all the intercepts, the 14 part-message received December 6th and in a separate message, its delivery instructions, should be interpreted. An attack on Pearl Harbor early on the morning of December 7th was highly probable.

While these messages were being decoded and distributed, so were other messages then being sent to Japanese embassies world wide directing destruction of codes and provision of alternative methods for providing information.

A second category of Japanese message traffic, that being sent the Japanese Ambassador in Washington in the Purple, or diplomatic code, was being translated by our Army and Navy code-breakers and distributed, but only in Washington. None of these were provided Kimmel or Short. As noted above, when viewed in the context of the other intercepts held in Washington, the diplomatic code messages clearly indicated the time and place of the surprise attack. The more significant ones follow.

- November 5th Purple (Diplomatic) code #736 (translated 11/5) Tokyo to Washington states that because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.
- November 16th Purple code (translated 11/17) Tokyo to Washington refers to # 736 above and advises ". . . . In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes (refers to German assault on Russia) and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution to these negotiations in 736 (i.e., 25 November) and there will be no change" and "You see how short time is, therefore do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. . . ."

COMMENT: The implications of this message must be assessed knowing that the Japanese are witnessing the buildup of our B-17 bomber forces in the Philippine Islands, and that this change in military posture is very recent.

- November 22nd # 812 purple code Tokyo to Washington another reference to #736 "It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. --- There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can (settle satisfactorily) we have decided to wait until that date. This for information of you two ambassadors alone."

COMMENT: Reasons beyond your ability to guess?, and, in the preceding message above ". . . . therefore do not allow the United States to delay the negotiations any further." Something big is imminent. Look for clues!

- November 30th #985 purple code instructs the Japanese ambassador to inform Hitler of British and American provocativeness, and that the Empire faces a "grave situation and must act with determination", that there is extreme danger that war may "come quicker than anyone dreams" and that this information must be held in the most absolute secrecy.
- December 1st Purple #865 (translated 12/4) Tokyo to Washington Situation continues increasingly critical however, to prevent U. S. from being unduly suspicious, we advising press and others in Japan negotiations continue.

COMMENT: "However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious--" Suspicious? of what? We (Japan) will employ deception for "reasons beyond your ability to guess."

- December 2nd Purple #867 (translated 12/3-4) Tokyo to Washington directs specific code destructions.
- December 6th Purple #901 (translated 12/6) Tokyo to Washington Extremely sensitive message in 14 parts coming. Await specific instructions by separate message as to when to present it.
- December 6th Purple #902 first 13 parts (translated 12/6) Tokyo to Washington. This message reviews entire sequence of negotiations,

notes the hardening of the U S proposal of November 26th "as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chunking," concludes these nations are as one in ignoring Japan's position.

COMMENT: When read by the President and close advisor, Harry Hopkins about 09:30 on the evening of December 6th, the President exclaimed: "This means war!"

- December 7th Purple #902 14th part (translated by Navy about midnight 12/6) Tokyo to Washington states U. S. and Britain conspired to thwart Japan. Not possible to reach agreement through further negotiations.

- December 7th Purple #907 (translated by Army during night of 12/6-7) Tokyo to Washington directs Ambassador to present 14 part message to Secretary of State at 1300 Washington time, December 7th.

The Japanese decoded message traffic is taken from the appendix in Pearl Harbor, Final Judgement, by Henry Clausen. The complete messages from which the above are gisted are provided in Exhibit F.

Another mishandled, significant indicator of an early surprise attack by the Japanese against either the Philippines or Hawaii was the so-called Winds Instruction message, translated November 26th and provided to Admiral Kimmel, not by Washington, but by the Commander, Asiatic Fleet, and the Winds Execute, or enemy identification message. The Winds Instruction message alerted various Japanese authorities of a possible initiation of hostilities against Russia, the British and Dutch, or the Americans, the choice to be indicated later in the form of a plain language weather report. This arrangement assumed previous orders to destroy codes will have been implemented. This message was intercepted November 19th, J-19 code numbers 2353 and 2354 and translated Nov 26th and 28th. The Dorn Report indicates that Kimmel was informed of this advisory of a soon-to-be-sent identity of who the enemy would be. In an overstatement of its significance he records as an error of judgment and evidence of an unacceptable state of cooperation

between Kimmel and Short, Kimmel's failure to pass this information to General Short.

More interesting, and far more significant, is what occurred following receipt in Washington of the execute message in which the United States was identified as the enemy. Why was that information not provided Kimmel and Short? This second message, the Winds Execute message, was erroneously claimed to have not been received in Washington. We now know that the Winds Execute message was intercepted by Naval Communications Station Cheltenham late on December 4th and immediately relayed to the Navy Department. It made its way partially through the Navy bureaucracy, and then "disappeared." Details, and sources are described in CRYPTOLOGIA in Exhibit G to this presentation. Confirmation was also provided by Army Brigadier General Clarke, an intelligence specialist, who saw the message. Admiral Kimmel was not informed of this development, nor was General Short. This message stated that the outbreak of hostilities would occur against American territory and/or forces. If Kimmel's failure to inform Short of the earlier Winds Instruction message was a significant error in judgment, what harm resulted from that failure? How much more grievous is Washington's failure to inform neither Kimmel nor Short of the execute message?

At least one principle cause of the extent of the Pearl Harbor disaster was clearly understood to have its roots in Washington. There is a quite remarkable admission by Henry Clausen and Bruce Lee in Pearl Harbor, Final Judgement since their comments otherwise are the most critical of Admiral Kimmel in any book on that subject known to me. In an astonishing inconsistency, they attribute the disaster to the foul-up in and by Washington in managing highly sensitive, relevant intelligence information, and conclude that had the intelligence been properly handled, the disaster could have been prevented. Their comments are provided in Exhibit H. Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, also suspected the real cause to be mishandled intelligence information. In Marching Orders author Bruce Lee states that on January 19, 1942, Stimson charged Alfred McCormack, a trusted associate, to recommend new procedures for handling and disseminating information derived from breaking enemy codes, overruling army opposition in the process.

Referring to the decoded message traffic disseminated within Washington prior to Pearl Harbor, (but not sent Kimmel) McCormack writes Stimson that, "it became apparent that the event had been clearly foreshadowed in the Japanese traffic of 1941." By his action Stimson makes clear his concerns regarding management of decoded messages.

Also in Pearl Harbor, Final Judgement author Clausen cites Stimson in equating Kimmel and Short to sentries. Stimson used that analogy in describing the magnitude of delinquency he attributed to the two Hawaiian commanders. But, who were the real sentries, the ones with eyes to see and ears to hear? They were the code breakers in Washington.

Why, then, did Stimson later refer to Kimmel and Short as sentries? The reason is clear. Stimson entertained two different explanations for the disaster; one for political reasons given the gravity of the military situation we then faced, the other to prevent additional disasters.

REALITIES IN COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS—CONSTRAINTS ON COMMAND AUTHORITY

Another major contributing factor to the disaster was, as noted earlier, a migration of authority from the fleet commanders-in-chief to the Directorate of War Planning in the offices of the Chief of Naval Operations commensurate with the President's assumption of a more detailed control of fleet operations. Again, no problem, that is, until something goes wrong, for the President was very personally engaged in the two-pronged, dangerous endeavor of constraining Japan in its aggressions while continuing to provide the greatest possible direct support to Britain. When the President replaced Admiral Richardson (no kin) in the fall of 1940, for attempting to move the Pacific Fleet away from Pearl Harbor, where it had been basing since about March, 1940, every fleet and force commander knew that the President was now exercising a degree of personal control over fleet activity. Henceforth, any significant force movement would, first, have to be cleared with Washington. By his action the President also transferred a degree

of responsibility for fleet security from Hawaii to Washington. This is not an error in judgment by the President. As noted previously, the decision to keep the fleet in Hawaii was a move calculated for its political effect. The potential for disaster arose later, with the subsequent movement of three battleships and the carrier *Yorktown* to the Atlantic in April, 1941, an action that substantially weakened the Pacific Fleet, especially in air power. As noted, these movements left Japan with a substantial advantage in air strike power and Admiral Kimmel with fewer operational options available to him. This was a risk taken, later proved to be an error in judgment, with its origin in Washington in the administration.

Senior Navy force commanders were further reminded of the migration to Washington of an increased degree of operational control by another event that occurred in January, 1941. "A Well Kept Secret" is an article written by Admiral Robert B. Carney published by SHIPMATE in the June, 1983 issue. The admiral (then a commander) recounts receiving a telephone call from BUPERS on January 31st, 1941, advising that he would receive orders within hours detaching him from Executive Officer of the battleship *California*, in Hawaii, to report to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington "without delay." Asking to detour via Coronado to see his wife, he was told "no." Upon his arrival, Admiral Bristol, to whom the CNO directed Carney to report, informed him that (Exhibit I):

The President had decided to form a special force for protection of shipping in the Atlantic, and that certain ships and aircraft would be allocated to the force. Because of still-existing popular aversion to U.S. involvement in the war, the innocuous title of Support Force was assigned. Bristol would be responsible to the President, not to the Navy's Atlantic Command—a most unusual arrangement.

When Carney submitted to Bristol a budget proposal for \$10 million, Bristol replied:

We would spend that in a week: we will seek \$100 million. Thereafter "we" applied the Bristol Factor - multiply by 10.

Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the firing of Richardson, we have the President taking direct control of the soon to be "engaged" naval forces in the Atlantic. Control was moved from the commander-in-chief in Norfolk, VA, in this specific instance to Washington. Domestic opposition to an involvement in the European war was strong. This arrangement likely could better assure accommodation to domestic political realities. And, of course, assumption of control of distribution of significant current intelligence, i.e., operational, or tactical intelligence, by the Director of War Plans in Washington to avoid unanticipated initiatives by a fleet commander, as noted earlier, further diminished the authority of Admiral Kimmel, limiting his operational options or freedom to act.

OBSERVATIONS AND ASSESSMENTS

Having explained that operational options are identified and/or implemented depending upon the degree of knowledge available at the time, is it not ironic that literally within minutes of the time Kimmel and his staff were engaged in assessing his situation in Honolulu, the President in Washington, upon completing reading the Japanese 13th part of the 14-Part Message to Nomura, remarked, "This means war," then upon return to his dinner guests, "We will be at war tomorrow." See Exhibit S. What possible supposition can explain Washington's failure to advise the Hawaiian commanders of an appraisal of this magnitude, based on information available in Washington but not in Hawaii? On the basis of diplomatic message code-breaking alone the likely location of an attack was indicated at about midnight, December 6th, when the 14th part was received, as were instructions for delivery. The Japanese choice of time for effecting delivery when assessed in the context of the decoded J-19 and Purple message traffic recorded in this presentation surely indicate an enormous likelihood that war will commence at about 07:30 AM, Hawaiian time. The Japanese penchant for initiating combat with a surprise attack was fully understood by military officers. And time was a strong indicator of place.

Diplomats, if anything, are knowledgeable about and deferential to the well known habits of their counterparts. Thus, Washington's knowledge that Ambassador Nomura was receiving instructions to seek a meeting with Secretary of State Cordell Hull at 1:00 PM,

Sunday, December 7th, did, indeed, raise very loud alarm bells. That was 07:30 Hawaiian time. Given the then widely known capabilities of carrier based aircraft—that launches took place at first light to accomplish join up, and so that as much time remained during daylight to increase extent of damage—identified Hawaii as the likely target of a surprise attack. As we would now say, it takes no rocket scientist to draw that conclusion. So here, again, the failure to notify Kimmel and Short immediately was another grievous error in judgment. There exists evidence that a meeting of principal advisers with the President took place in the White House around midnight on the 6th. Navy Secretary Knox expressed surprise to Admiral Kimmel during his visit to Pearl Harbor following the attack that he had not been alerted to the events of December 6th, an item presumably discussed during that meeting. However, for whatever reasons, Kimmel was not informed.

An anomaly among many, one that appears to reflect the tightness of control being exercised in Washington over fleet activity, occurred at about 10:30 Sunday morning, two and a half hours before the attack. The CNO, Admiral Stark, was being briefed on the 14 part Purple message and its delivery instructions. The briefer pleaded with Admiral Stark to pick up the phone and call Admiral Kimmel. Stark picked it up, thought a moment and put it back down, saying he would "call the President instead." Had he called as requested, Kimmel would have had what he needed to implement his one remaining operational option—setting General Quarters, an action that can be completed in fifteen minutes.

In his statement to the attendees assembled in the Senate Armed Service's Hearing room on April 27th, 1995, Admiral Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, notes the strange behavior of the Chief of Staff, U S Army General George C. Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, during the night of December 6th and the following morning. Seemingly, neither was available at a time both they and the President well knew was exceedingly dangerous. (Exhibit A, pages 32, 33.) Admiral Moorer notes that in his view Admiral Kimmel used the forces available and the capabilities available to their extreme. On another occasion he has stated that if Nelson and Napoleon had been in command in Hawaii, the results

would have been the same. Admiral Moorer stated to the assembled group:

So I think in all justice, anyone that has to make a decision on this problem should make certain that they are completely aware; A) of the military situation in Hawaii and the Pacific Ocean, and B) the political situation and the information that was available here in Washington. And I believe if one really gives that a thorough look, and uses common sense in his judgment, he will see that the fair thing to do is to restore the rank of 4 stars to Admiral Kimmel.

COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO THE ADMINISTRATION IN WASHINGTON

A too often overlooked parallel to the relationship of intelligence to military initiatives is its relationship to initiation of diplomatic actions. Diplomatic initiatives can also be taken in the course of evolving situations in reaction to incoming intelligence. We had a situation that December 6th where the President and his military leaders in Washington had an operational option, an initiative available to them, that Kimmel, lacking that information, did not. It matters not that Stark was at an opera and Marshall was who knows where—the intelligence judged by the President as indicating war was available in Washington sixteen hours before the attack. The President could have directed notification of the Japanese embassy, or the Japanese in Tokyo, of his "suspicions," thereby eliminating in Japanese minds any benefit to be derived from surprise. Such notification could have been accomplished in ways that would not have involved a breach of security. His other option was to make sure Kimmel knew. He did neither.

COURSES OF ACTION AVAILABLE TO ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND GENERAL SHORT

The Dorn Report asserts that the fact that others were also at fault does not absolve Admiral Kimmel and General Short from accountability. If Kimmel and Short were derelict, as the Robert's Commission judged, or used faulty judgment as the Dorn Report claims, that issue is properly resolved by considering the courses of

action (operational options) available to Kimmel and Short but not used, or not properly used. Where was judgment faulty, and what resulted there from? Did failures by others create or lead to faulty decisions by Admiral Kimmel and General Short? Was it within their combined capabilities to have initiated actions that would have thwarted the Japanese attack, or substantially reduced the scale of deaths and damage? Is not this the crux in an assessment of their blame?

Both aircraft carrier battle groups, the *Enterprise* and *Lexington*, departed Pearl during the two weeks prior to the surprise attack pursuant to orders from Washington with reinforcements for Wake and Midway Islands. When not engaged in gunnery and other fleet exercises at sea, units of the fleet were moored in Pearl Harbor. When in port, crews were required to be aboard in adequate numbers day and night to set General Quarters and to man all (repeat, all) anti-aircraft guns. Ammunition was placed in ready ammunition boxes at all AAA gun sites. The orders in effect required one fourth to one half of the antiaircraft guns, depending on the type of ship, to actually be manned at all times when in port. Small ships had the lower requirement. The specified condition of readiness required that ships watertight integrity be maintained except where necessary for regular access by the crew. Is it not noteworthy that these orders remained in effect throughout the year following the surprise attack? These arrangements assured that the full defensive capabilities of the ships in Pearl Harbor could be employed, a fourth to a half of the ship-based anti-aircraft guns instantly, the balance in minutes. Admiral Inglis testified that on the morning of the attack, all (repeat, all) antiaircraft batteries were manned and firing within four to seven minutes.

The 3:00 PM Saturday staff meeting convened by Admiral Kimmel reviewed the general situation and current fleet status. In the absence of air support, ordering the ships to sea would be unwise, pointless. Apart from his plans for conducting surveillance, his only option was to set General Quarters, thereby making his ships more resistant to damage from air and submarine attack. For this he needed indications that an attack was imminent. The discussion during the 3:00 PM meeting that referred to the lack of knowledge of the location of the Japanese aircraft carriers did not warrant any

initiative beyond that indicated the day before, or the day before that. Nor was there reason to take exception to General Short's interpretation of the war warning message in the absence of indicators of imminent attack, indicators that even then were being distributed and read in Washington, and interpreted as "We will be at war tomorrow."

However, force commanders remain responsible for making sound decisions governing their force employment whether or not the available intelligence is adequate. To further clarify what Kimmel could have done to greater advantage December 6th, let us assume that Washington had kept Kimmel fully informed, and Kimmel had concluded that an attack was likely the next morning. Or, assume that despite long odds his reconnaissance aircraft had spotted the Japanese attack force during daylight, December 6th. What could he have done that would have defeated the attack, or reduced the extent of damage?

If the admiral had ordered the fleet to sea, what would have been its purpose? To seek and destroy, pitting battleships against carriers in a venture *ad absurdum*? To hide? The prevalent professional view at the time was that pitting 18 knot battleships armed with 15 mile turreted guns against 30 knot aircraft carriers with 275 mile air-strike ranges was foolish. Given the six carrier strength of the attacking force, even with full information the only prudent option available to Admiral Kimmel was to remain in port and set general quarters at sunrise in preparation for an attack. Presumably he would have done that. Although we are dealing here with conjecture, the point is that Admiral Kimmel did the only sensible thing, which was the same with or without intelligence, and no one has yet identified what he should have done differently that can withstand critical scrutiny. That challenge stands open. Given the relative strengths of Japanese naval forces and those available to Admiral Kimmel, it is clear that the Japanese were in complete control of events. The idea that it was within Kimmel's power to have somehow thwarted or overcome the attack is nonsense.

The Navy Court of Inquiry convened in 1943 to inquire into the Pearl Harbor disaster was composed of three very senior naval officers. Their reasoning was that of experienced force commanders. The

realities enumerated above were known, and their significance understood, by these three gentlemen. This court found Admiral Kimmel blameless. Pertinent also is the fact that this court knew of the decoded Japanese messages, including those recorded in this paper that were distributed in Washington, but not sent to Admiral Kimmel. Their finding, however, was reversed at the political level, first by the CNO, Admiral King, who cited misuse of Kimmel's surveillance resources as his reason, and by further endorsement by the Secretary of the Navy, who cited misuse of his patrol aircraft Kimmel's "most grievous fault." As previously noted, Admiral King in a July 14, 1948 letter to the Secretary of Defense withdrew his endorsement.

Also pertinent in this regard is that in an earlier appeal by the Kimmel family, the then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlyle Trost, relying on a report by the naval historian who also cited misuse of Kimmel's patrol planes, recommended against approval. Upon reading the recent, thorough analysis of Admiral Kimmel's use of his patrol planes by Mr. Gannon (exhibit T), Admiral Trost advised the Secretary of the Navy that he no longer supported the position he had taken, and requested that his adverse endorsement on the Kimmel family request be withdrawn. See Exhibit L. The Gannon analysis convincingly demonstrates that Kimmel simply did not have aircraft in anywhere near the numbers required for even sustained 180 degree coverage. It is noted that Admiral Kimmel sought and followed the advice of his top air commanders in employing his patrol aircraft. His decisions were not arbitrary.

It should be noted here that all forces assigned the Pacific Fleet in war plans approved in Washington were for employment at sea away from Pearl Harbor. War plans at war's outset envisioned fleet operations toward Midway to the northwest and the Japanese controlled Marshall Islands to the west and southwest. Patrol aircraft would patrol this operating area to permit a more secure and effective employment of Pacific Fleet's three aircraft carriers (one of which was on the West Coast at the time of the attack) and nine battleships in offensive and defensive operations pending reinforcement. The pace of employment of patrol aircraft prior to war's outbreak was constrained by the needs of that operational readiness requirement.

Ships of the fleet when in Pearl were placed in Army plans for coordination of anti-aircraft defenses, with the Commander 14th Naval District the designated adviser to the Senior Officer Present Afloat in implementation of those plans. The 14th Naval District Commander maintained liaison with the Army in effecting those arrangements. Defense of Hawaii was an Army responsibility. Readiness status of Army forces in Hawaii were matters under control of Lieutenant General Short and General Marshall in Washington. Here an error of significance occurred. The war warning message to General Short was interpreted to mean the principal danger was sabotage. Short ordered his fighter aircraft placed in the center of his airfields, with guards to prevent their being sabotaged and, as directed in the Army war warning message (Exhibit J), reported the action he was taking to Army headquarters in Washington. In subsequent testimony General Marshall admitted his opportunity and failure in this instance. The Army Pearl Harbor Board generally criticized the conduct of the Secretary of Army, the Chief of Staff, the then Chief of War Plans Division and General Short, but made no recommendations.

Was Kimmel derelict in not objecting to General Short's action? Had he been in possession of the intelligence available in Washington and not done so, he would have been. His interjection, however, would have been limited to an expression of an opinion. The authorities and responsibilities of force commanders in the field were specified and allocated by the respective chiefs of services in Washington, with approval by the President, not by Admiral Kimmel, who was devoid of authority to change plans that were arranged between Generals Short and Marshall.

Despite the pledge by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to "examine the matter without preconceptions so that a judgment can be reached on the basis of fact and fairness," it is obvious that the Dorn Report relies instead primarily on information contained in earlier hearings and inquiries that were designed to deflect criticism from Washington. Statements and accusations that we now know are inaccurate, or false, that appeared in the congressional inquiry reappear in the Dorn Report, and are included with comment in exhibit M.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In summary, the disaster at Pearl Harbor was rooted in and caused by:

A - The adoption in Washington of a military strategy that weakened the forces allocated to the Pacific Fleet substantially below those available to the Japanese during a time and in an area of likely conflict, while

B - Incrementally increasing the economic, political and military pressures on the Japanese government by limiting sales and shipment of scrap steel and oil products, then shortly before the attack, adoption of a hard line negotiating position including the demand that Japan relinquish its conquered territories on the Asian continent, and

C - For a variety of reasons transfer of a degree of control over the operational activity of fleet forces, taking it away from their titular heads, the Commanders-in-Chief, to the Director of War Plans within the office of the CNO, which he then exercised imprudently by denying transmission to the fleet Commanders-in-Chief crucially important tactical (as distinct from strategic) intelligence information.

D - The failure of intelligence in Washington to collect information, analyze and distribute throughout Washington and the fleets in the years preceding the attack accurate threat assessments listing the capabilities of Japanese military equipment and personnel performance in combat, and lastly,

E - The thoroughness of planning and excellence of execution by the Japanese attack force.

2. The first three of the above actions, possibly even including the failure to provide current intelligence, were risks deemed required and acceptable by our national leadership given the extent of deteriorating worldwide political and military situations, complicated by our inadequate force structure, in light of our President's overall strategic objective, the defeat of Hitler.

3. There was no reasonable course of action available to Admiral Kimmel during the several days preceding the attack, other than to preset General Quarters the morning of the attack, that would have enabled him to thwart the Japanese attack, or limit the extent of damages, and there was no lapse of foresight nor evidence of faulty judgment on his part.

4. Washington's failure to keep Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short fully and continuously informed regarding intelligence being derived from code-breaking was a grievous error that may have prevented Admiral Kimmel presetting General Quarters, and did eliminate fighter defense of Oahu. This failure increased the scale and scope of damage to the fleet and to other military objectives, with attendant larger losses in lives of Army and Navy personnel.

5. Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short should have their reputations restored, and should be advanced posthumously in retirement to their pre-Pearl Harbor disaster ranks.

THE STORY STILL UNFOLDING

When asked do I believe President Roosevelt knew that the Japanese were about to attack Pearl Harbor, my answer is, "Yes. A qualified yes." To the query "why the hedge," my answer is that while a considerable body of evidence supports the view that he knew, it does not yet seem beyond reasonable doubt. It is my observation that when a series of apparently dumb actions are taken across a span of time by otherwise highly competent individuals, there is more to the story. If a reason common to all of them can be deduced that makes sense in light of the situations of the moment, then that reason is likely the real reason—the two alternate reasons, protecting our code breaking successes and bureaucratic bungling fit too few of these troubling situations. Then, some evidence is unequivocal.

William Casey, a former head of the CIA, in his book, The Secret War Against Hitler, makes the flat out statement that Churchill had alerted Roosevelt of the impending attack. Note the last sentence from the following quote, page 7 (Exhibit 0):

The months before Pearl Harbor showed the bureaucratic problems Donovan would encounter. As the Japanese storm began to gather force in the Pacific, the most private communications, between the Japanese government and its ambassadors in Washington, Berlin, Rome and other major capitals were being read in Washington. Army and Navy cryptographers having broken the Japanese diplomatic cipher, were reading messages that foretold the attack. The British had sent word that a Japanese fleet was steaming east toward Hawaii.

Casey does not explain the basis for his claim.

Joseph Leib was a reporter for United Press in Washington, and a confidant of Cordell Hull. Before he died, on numerous occasions he said that he was told on November 28th, 1941, by Cordell Hull that the Japanese were planning an attack on Pearl Harbor within a few days. He tried to get his boss to publish that information, but his boss refused. He was able to persuade an underling to do so. The only paper to pick it up was the *Honolulu Advertiser*.

Constantine Brown was a reporter for the Washington Star. In his book entitled, The Coming of the Whirlwind, he tells of a friend, whom he does not identify, that came to see him on December 5th, in a state of ill-suppressed excitement. "This is it," he exclaims, "The Japs are ready to attack. We've broken their code, and we've read their orders." Brown states that he was referring to the "Winds" execute message. The informant brought the word to him in person because he did not trust a messenger. Brown considered the story too hot to publish, reasoning that it might reveal code-breaking successes, and in any event it would already have been read by the President. According to recorded testimony the Winds Execute message was first reported as never having been received in the Navy Department. Later, in the face of direct evidence to the contrary, the Winds Execute message was declared "lost." It identified the enemy as the United States. As noted elsewhere in this analysis, this is another extremely important message that was not provided Admiral Kimmel or General Short. The Winds Execute message did not indicate a time for attack. The time of attack was strongly implied by the delivery instructions that accompanied the 14-part Purple

diplomatic code message broken around midnight, two days later, on December 6th.

Brigadier General Elliott Thorpe was a military attaché in Dutch-controlled Java in 1941. Admiral Layton in And I Was There, advises that we now know the Dutch were also reading the JN-25 Japanese Navy operational code. According to the newspaper account of Thorpe's death at age 91, (Exhibit Q) the Dutch informed Thorpe of the impending attack against the Philippines, Thailand and Hawaii. General Thorpe immediately cabled the information to Washington, but his warning allegedly was not taken seriously. A week later the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Admiral Edwin Layton was Intelligence Officer first to Admiral Kimmel, then to Admiral Nimitz.

Major General Bonner Fellers in a letter to Admiral Kimmel dated March 6, 1967, (Exhibit P replicates the entire letter) advised:

About 10:00 AM Friday, December 6th, 1941, I walked into the Royal Air Force Headquarters in Cairo. Air Marshall Lonmore (spelling), who was then in command of the RAF Middle East, sat at his desk. Immediately he opened with: "Bonner, you will be in the war in 24 hours." He continued: "We have a secret signal Japan will strike the US in 24 hours."

In letters to both President Clinton and Senator Thurmond, Helen E. Hamman of Frankfurt, Ohio, reported that her father, in 1941 head of Disaster Services of the Red Cross, had been called shortly before the attack by President Roosevelt, and told that his intelligence staff had informed him of a pending Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor, and that her father should be prepared to deal with expected casualties. I am advised that a recent review of Red Cross files corroborates that story.

Predominant in the many inexplicable occurrences that continue to intrigue researchers is the strange, out-of-character behavior of General Marshall, who seemingly, could not be reached the evening before, or found the morning following the President's exclamations "This means war," and "We will be at war tomorrow." His unavailability compounded by his subsequent dilatory handling of the alert message to the Hawaiian commanders suggests more at work

than a casual state of mind. If on the other hand, events were proceeding along an anticipated course, with our leaders awaiting an expected event, it made sense. His conduct suggests a desire to avoid initiating an alert based on Purple Magic information received during 6 December.

Marshall's behavior continued to haunt those who were intimately involved with him during that troubling time. On May 4, 1961 Brigadier General Bonner Fellers had as his guests for lunch Brigadier General Carter Clarke and a Dr. Charles G. Tansill. Dr. Tansill was a professor of history at Georgetown, and an author of an excellent book about FDR's entrance into the war and Pearl Harbor. General Clarke was a central figure in War Dept. intelligence, directly involved in the analysis and distribution of decoded Japanese message traffic before and after Pearl Harbor. Clarke stated (additional confirmation that the Winds Execute message was distributed in Washington) that on December 4th the "East Wind Rain" message was received. As already noted, this device to inform Japanese worldwide that war had been decided upon, had been revealed by our code-breakers. "East Wind Rain" meant war with America was imminent. Clarke noted that this information was greeted with no apparent surprise, that senior Army and Navy officers were seemingly unconcerned. This changed, taking on a comic opera quality, according to Clarke, upon receipt of the Japanese diplomatic traffic, December 6th. The record of the meeting is contained in Exhibit R. The unstated but completely obvious implication is that the senior officers to whom he referred knew what was to be, but only on Dec. 6th did they know when. Since the time of delivery of the diplomatic traffic was to occur on a Sunday at 1:00 PM, i.e., 07:30 AM in Hawaii, that would be the optimum hour to commence air-strike operations. What is equally clear from this report of meeting is that the over three thousand deaths at Pearl Harbor were still very much on their minds twenty years later.

The recorded views of, as well as actions taken by, many who served on the staffs in Washington of the chiefs of service in positions charged with analyzing, distributing and briefing information derived from code-breaking in the days prior to December 7th, make clear they understood the meaning and significance of that intelligence.

The idea that the chiefs of service, the service secretaries, the Secretary of State and other key advisers to the President did not understand is beyond believability. Why would Admiral Stark not complete the call to Kimmel he started to make at the urging of the briefing officer three hours before the attack? The significance of the requested 1:00 PM meeting with the Secretary of State was not lost on Stark's briefer. Why would he put the phone down, saying he would call the President instead? (page 303, And I Was There). According to Admiral Layton the call was made, however, Stark was told the President was occupied. What state of mind, or administrative process, then prevented him from calling Kimmel? Does this behavior pattern not resemble that of General Marshall? Again, the purpose being served makes sense if the objective was to not cause change in the flow of events at that point in time.

The evidence is persuasive enough that Churchill knew the time, probably the place, of the attack. Several possible sources existed. Soviet agents under control of Richard Sorge had penetrated top level Japanese authorities including a member of the Imperial Family and the Moscow and Bangkok Japanese embassies. Stalin had transferred seven divisions of troops from the Far East to the defense of Moscow, leaving that area defenseless, and was desirous of Japanese force involvement elsewhere. Stalin is therefore a possible source. Another possible source was British penetration of Soviet cipher message traffic. Still another, and the most likely, British and Dutch penetration of the Japanese JN-25 five cipher naval operational code. According to Betrayal at Pearl Harbor, by James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, the British code-breakers in Singapore succeeded in breaking the JN-25 code. Nave is credited as having led that effort. The code, itself, was not exceptionally difficult, but success required collecting an unusually large amount of radio transmissions. Singapore intercepted Japanese message traffic being sent the Pearl Harbor Strike Force, was able to decode and determine the strike force's mission, and so informed London, with request that Hawaii be informed. According to Nave "Climb NIITAKAYAMA 1208, repeat 1208!" [on 8 December, Tokyo time], was the final message sent. This was 7 December, Hawaii time. Niitakayama is the highest mountain in the Japanese empire. What Churchill may have told Roosevelt based on this and other sources remains conjectural. Of interest is the fact that the JN-25 code was also broken by Mrs.

Driscoll, a code-breaker in OP-20-G, working under Captain Safford, but had not advanced to an exploitative stage by that time.

Eric Nave allegedly reported to London that a Japanese fleet of 6 carriers, 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser and 9 destroyers had departed the Kuriles for Hawaii and refueled December 4th. London was asked to inform Hawaii. These figures are a match with those contained in the alleged German decrypt of the Churchill/Roosevelt November 26th conversation described by Gregory Douglas.

The information that Churchill advised Roosevelt that a Japanese naval force was en-route Pearl Harbor, its purpose to attack the fleet, is alleged in Gestapo Chief—The 1948 Interrogation of Heinrich Muller , by Gregory Douglas, a specialist in intelligence research. He states that this conversation took place on an AT&T created scrambler radio-telephone known as the A-3 system that was commercially available. This system was in use in Germany from before the war. I am informed by a former high official in the National Security Agency that the A-3 system was easily broken. Douglas states that this conversation was descrambled and distributed within Germany. According to Douglas, Heinrich Muller brought it and many other intercepts with him to this country, where he lived for 14 years, occupied at least initially, in informing the U. S. what Germany knew about Stalin and the USSR. A copy of the alleged intercept is provided as Exhibit W. Of special interest is the Churchill question: "What about Chiang Kai-shek? Is he not having a very thin diet?" , which appears elsewhere as well. There is a view that this document may have been a fake, planted after war's end in the German archives. If this were so, what purpose was served, and why did not its "planters" make use of it? Why did it lay fallow for decades? We do know that the Germans were efficient, successful code-breakers.

Admiral Layton cites these same words in indication that news of Japan's treachery had come directly to the President from Churchill. The cover note to the American Embassy in London of 26 November that enclosed Churchill's "thin diet for Chiang Kai-shek" dispatch was marked Most Secret. It apologized for the lateness of the hour of its delivery—yet nothing is contained, at least as it is now

presented, that could have warranted waking up top level embassy personnel at 3:00 AM. Had it been sent at daybreak, it still would have reached Washington early that morning. Layton believed that another communication took place that date, one not in the record, for which the "thin diet" message serves as a convenient cover.

The Army's chief code-breaker, William F. Friedman, expressed outrage that Admiral Kimmel was surprised by the attack, exclaiming "But they knew. They knew." When the Navy's chief code-breaker, Captain Laurance Safford anticipated that he would be called as a witness in any Pearl Harbor investigation, he began looking for relevant documents. It was then that he discovered that none of the code-broken messages had been sent Admiral Kimmel. He became incensed then, on February 22, 1944, went by train to New York, met with the admiral and acquainted him with the contents of those messages.

Safford was called before the Admiral Hart Inquiry where he testified as to the existence and substance of the decoded messages. He was not asked for and did not provide copies to the Hart Inquiry. It became necessary for Admiral Kimmel to request permission of the Secretary of the Navy to provide to the Navy Court of Inquiry the decoded messages. Secretarial stonewalling of his request ended when Admiral Kimmel threatened to hold a press conference to publicize the fact that the Navy court was being denied important information. Later, in his appearance before the Army board, after Admiral Kimmel had answered all questions regarding the performance of General Short, he was asked if he had further information relating to the disaster. Kimmel then revealed to them the information derived from code-breaking, leaving them "astonished." There were rumors, according to an Army Board member, that such messages existed and that they had been purged from Army files. But for the coincidence of Captain Safford's desire to refresh his memory, their removal from their proper location in Navy files as well by Commander Kramer would have prevented their being seen by Admiral Kimmel's designee, Captain Lavender. Why Kramer did this improper and unusual action is conjectural. It does, however, suggest a coordinated attempt higher up to prevent these messages from being made known to both Army and Navy Inquiries.

The date of November 26th, 1941, continues to intrigue many inquirers into the circumstances leading to the disaster. Chapter 18, entitled "Negotiations Off" in Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton's book, And I Was There addressed most issues surrounding that date, both known and as yet unexplained. Pertinent paragraphs are replicated in exhibit N. Why, he asked, did Secretary of State Hull confront the Japanese ambassadors on the afternoon of November 26th with the hard-line position the Japanese referred to as an ultimatum when, until then, the agreed strategy was to seek accommodation until the buildup of our forces in the Philippines could be completed? Why would Secretary Hull declare the sudden shift in strategy in the course of its implementation as his decision when there was no doubt whatsoever that the President was in direct control of all our actions then being taken? In Hull's memoirs he claimed as his reason for so advising the President that even a temporary *modus vivendi* with Japan would undermine Chinese morale, and quotes an extract from a communication from Churchill to Roosevelt that states: "What about Chiang Kai-shek? Is he not having a very thin diet?" How frequently we encounter these words!

Of interest is an extract from the report of a recent symposium held at the Admiral Nimitz Foundation in Fredericksburg, Texas, as reported in Naval Intelligence Professionals quarterly, entitled "The Gathering Storm", page 4: (Exhibit V) which states;

In mid-November Stimson abandoned his hard-line position because of continual warnings from Marshall and Stark. Tokyo would not endure three more months of diplomatic procrastinations while their oil reserves drained away. On 17 November Hull and Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau proposed a six months truce in the oil and rice embargo, provided Japanese troops left Indo China. On 25 November Stimson, Knox, Stark and Marshall agreed to a new "modus vivendi" with Japan. But if they do not accept this compromise, said Roosevelt, how then can we get them to make the first aggressive move? (on that same day a Japanese task force put to sea for Hawaii). Two days later Hull gave Ambassador Nomura and Special Envoy Kurusu an uncompromising ultimatum. We do not know why this came about. We know only that Hull did it

with the greatest reluctance, and he did it on instructions from Roosevelt.

There was, indeed, a mindset that a Japanese attack in SE Asia was imminent. Navy's war warning message specifically mentioned the Philippines, Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo as likely choices for an amphibious assault. Army's war warning message stated that if hostilities could not be avoided, the United States desired that Japan commit the first overt act. The expected amphibious attack, however, did not rule out a concurrent attack against Hawaii. Nor can it be ruled out that despite evidence to the contrary, Roosevelt just refused to believe the Japanese would attack Hawaii. There is another possibility. He may have underestimated Japanese air-strike effectiveness, as did many at that time, and reasoned that an attack against Pearl Harbor would have had only minor success, and would have served his purpose. In that case the surprise at Pearl Harbor was the extent of damages received.

The altogether regretful thing is that because damages in Hawaii were so extensive, the issue became politicized. Admissions of Washington miscalculations would not only become indicators of Presidential incompetence, but would also jeopardize all that he had risked in pursuing his objective—the defeat of Hitler. The consequence is misjudgment of all three principals, President Roosevelt, Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

President Roosevelt went to war personally about the time of the fall of France. Aid to Britain in his view was a mandatory first step, our entry into the war an essential later action, and it was clear that an initial offensive combat action by Germany or Japan was prerequisite. His actions taken in defense of his authority and effectiveness before this nation entered the war should be judged in light of his objective—the defeat of Hitler, and of his immediate purpose—to induce an attack on our forces or territory in order to get us into the war. To remind us of the magnitude of the problem he faced, we need only recall that our rearmament after war's outbreak in Europe passed in the congress by a one vote majority. There are numerous examples of Presidential deceptions. In war deception, when successful, is a virtue. The many initiatives he subsequently took, both political and military, the deceptive among them, were designed

to achieve his wartime aims while hampered by our own vastly inferior forces.

The Dorn Report asserts that "The official treatment of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was substantially temperate and procedurally correct." Now, withholding significant information, or attempting to do so, in a duly constituted judicial procedure, if not criminal, is most certainly prejudicial to achieving a just outcome. There is simply no question but that there was a consistent, concerted effort to keep knowledge of the existence of the vitally important intelligence derived from code-broken Japanese messages from the many inquiries into the Pearl Harbor disaster. Was it for the purpose of maintaining security of this capability that was of such crucial importance to the conduct of military operations? Not believable. The fact is we were more open with our British allies than with our own senior military officers designated to head the Army and Navy courts. In 1941 we gave the British two "purple" diplomatic code deciphering machines that had been purchased for Admiral Kimmel's use, and did not reorder. Another decoder was given the Commander, Asiatic Fleet. Given this background, and the intimacy of our mutual code-breaking arrangements with the British, security could not be the real motivator for the denial to the Army and Navy courts. Then what was? The real reason was the desire to hide the fact that crucially important information held in Washington had not been provided Kimmel and Short. Withholding information on the one hand, while employing "substantially temperate treatment" of the Hawaiian commanders by avoiding sworn testimony in courts martial that would inevitably reveal information embarrassing to the administration on the other, is anything but substantially temperate treatment.

Many senior naval officers during and after the war knew that Admiral Kimmel and General Short had been scapegoated. Two references serve to make that point. Admiral Raymond Spruance answered naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison who had written him regarding the disparate treatment meted out to Kimmel and Short as compared to that of General MacArthur. MacArthur's delinquencies included a direct disobedience of orders from General Marshall plus loss of his aircraft to Japanese attack nine hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor because he refused to allow

General Brereton to launch them against Japanese forces in Formosa. Admiral Spruance replied:

I have always felt that Kimmel and Short were held responsible for Pearl Harbor in order that the American people might have no reason to lose confidence in their government in Washington. This was probably justifiable under the circumstances at that time, but it does not justify forever damning those two fine officers.

The point you raise about General MacArthur is well taken; but the Army would have lost a very able man if MacArthur had been dealt with as Kimmel and Short were.

Admiral Halsey expressed similar views in a personal letter to Admiral Kimmel. Admiral Halsey and Admiral Spruance were Navy's most experienced and honored naval combat commanders in World War II.

It is pertinent also to note that both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner, particularly Admiral Turner in numerous combat actions as the Amphibious Force commander, served with distinction throughout the war. Admiral Turner's resoluteness in his landing of Marines on Guadalcanal, and in his many support and re-supply operations were enablers of our victory there. Although both were at the center of pre-war bungling in the Navy Department, they were significant figures in our subsequent victory, and were so recognized. Admiral Kimmel and General Short were denied further roles.

EPILOGUE

Divers initially engaged in rescuing entrapped personnel within compartments of ships sunk by bombs and torpedoes during the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and in salvaging those ships, describe the murky conditions in the surrounding waters caused mainly by oil on the surface, some of it still burning as they worked. Numerous authors and other individuals who, for whatever reason, inquire into the events, actions and explanations that preceded and followed that *Day of Infamy* have also struggled with a

murkiness brought about by the potential political and military consequences that marked its aftermath. As information that was once highly classified has been released into the public domain, the popular belief that the commanders in Hawaii were to blame for their inattentiveness has steadily changed. Even though all pertinent information has not yet been released, the record is now clear that the errors then committed, and mistakes in judgment then being made, were being made in Washington, not in Hawaii.

In his oft repeated observation, eloquent in its simplicity, Robert Burns got it right. When dealing with uncertainty in military situations we see, or think we see, clearly in hindsight what should have been done in various combat actions. When assessing blame for what "Gang aft a-gley" in some military encounter, we must examine whether or not a commander was assiduous in his search for solutions, attentive to the advice of his subordinates, or heedless or unreasonable in one or more aspects of the encounter that were foreseeable. If a commander's decisions were thoughtfully arrived at, but for some unknown or even foolish action taken by an opponent, are seen in retrospect to be erroneous, that commander did not fail his obligations. A more perfect knowledge is the antidote, the distribution and exploitation of which is the obligation of every commander in a command chain. This is my basis for judging Admiral Kimmel.

My interest in the Pearl Harbor disaster commenced in about 1982, when I purchased in an estate sale a seven page, hand-written, letter by Admiral Kimmel to the movie star, the Rose of the Silent Screen, Corrine Griffith, which she then had mounted in a frame and displayed in her living room. He and Mrs. Kimmel had been invited to one of her parties. His explanation in response to her question about what caused Pearl Harbor was frequently interrupted as other guests came up. So, upon, their return home he wrote his explanation in the letter. In it he mentioned Captain Safford, then Navy's chief cryptanalyst, as the one who opened his eyes as to what had really taken place.

At that time I was a member of a subcommittee of the Naval Research Advisory Committee that specialized in matters associated with highly sensitive naval intelligence. This group was comprised mostly of scientists and technical experts who were outside advisers

to the Naval Security Group, which is the offspring of Captain Safford's OP-20-G. I presented the Kimmel letter to Rear Admiral Dillingham, then Commander, Naval Security Group, for inclusion in the NSG museum in honor of Captain Safford. As an experienced operational commander I knew first hand command need for and dependence on intelligence support in applying force to greater advantage. As I inquired more into the circumstances surrounding the Pearl Harbor disaster, it became clear to me that political concerns, then and since, have served to preclude an honest appraisal of its causes. The price we paid was enormous. The lessons we should have learned are valuable as we look ahead.

In earlier times I was a fighter pilot aboard the carrier *Saratoga* during the Guadalcanal invasion then, subsequently, in September and October of '42, shore-based there on Henderson Field. I achieved four shoot-downs of Japanese aircraft, and was myself wounded and shot down. During the Korean War I served as Executive Officer of a carrier with a Marine air-wing aboard engaged in direct support of Marine troops ashore. During the Vietnam War, I commanded the aircraft carrier task forces in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1966-67. I am a graduate of the U. S. Naval Academy, Class of '36, have also been a student at the Royal Navy Staff College, Greenwich, England, and both a student and staff member at our Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. My duties on the staff involved preparation of critical analyses of combat actions during WW II. I have served in the Strategic Plans Group on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in Strategic Plans and Policy on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations. These duties and combat experiences have made clear to me that an accurate historical record of our past political and military events and actions is a rich heritage, highly useful as we work our way through future difficult problems. The Pearl Harbor disaster is a perfect case in point for pressing the need for a proper management and exploitation of intelligence, by political as well as military authorities, and is the yet to be officially recognized lesson to be learned from that disastrous event.

A second reason developed as I became more knowledgeable of what had really transpired prior to December 7th. When viewed in the context of operational realities, it became clear that a terrible injustice has been done to the two Pearl Harbor commanders and,

consequently, to the historic account of those momentous events.
The record should be set straight.

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August 4th, 1997