

## Why Did the Attack on Pearl Harbor Occur? An Intelligence Failure?

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover  
Thought He Knew

Thomas K. Kimmel, Jr.  
and J. A. Williams

### Introduction



Tom Kimmel

On December 7, 1941 the President of the United States was asked: “How did the Japanese catch us with our pants down?”<sup>1</sup> The Congress of the United States later asked: “one enigmatical and paramount question ... [w]hy was it possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur?”<sup>2</sup>

On December 11, 1941, the Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, thought he had the answer and sent it to the President immediately: Army and Navy Intelligence in Washington, D.C. had learned the entire Japanese attack plan days before the attack, and sent it to Admiral Kimmel, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, who did nothing about it.

Supreme Court Associate Justice Owen Roberts, Chairman of the Roberts Commission,<sup>3</sup> the tribunal

1. John Toland, *Infamy, Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath*, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1982), page 14.

2. *Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack Congress of the United States, Majority Report*, page 253; *Pearl Harbor Attack* [hereafter PHA], U. S. Congress, Joint Congressional Committee [hereafter JCC] on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, 79<sup>th</sup> Congress, 40 parts (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946, Part 40, page 253 [Hereafter 40PHA253]).

3. Nine days after the attack President Roosevelt appointed sitting Supreme Court Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts to investigate the Pearl Harbor attack. Forty-seven days after the attack, the Roberts Report blamed Admiral Kimmel and General Short as “solely responsible” for the success of the attack, and declared them “derelict in their duty,” while

immediately appointed to investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster, tried but could not prove that Kimmel had this information and failed to act on it. But then Roberts put blinders on and failed to follow Mr. Hoover’s logically suggested written investigative leads in Washington, D.C., as to whether this information was available in Washington and simply not sent to Hawaii. And then later, Roberts inexplicably lied to Congress about where he got the original allegation against Kimmel.

### I. The FBI’s source December 11, 1941, four days after the attack.

In a memorandum dated December 11, 1941, FBI Assistant Director D. M. Ladd informed FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and several of his assistants, that:

Colonel John T. Bissell<sup>4</sup> today informed G. C. Burton<sup>5</sup>, in the strictest of confidence (and with the

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Washington top officials were found to have “fulfilled their obligations.”

4. The source’s name was redacted by the FBI circa 1979 when the document was first released publicly by the FBI. The source was identified in 2002 when the FBI accessioned the information to the National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA). Colonel John T. Bissell is identical to Brigadier General John Ter Bush Bissell. He had been Chief of Counter Intelligence, MID, G-2, Army intelligence in Washington, D.C., during the attack. As reported by the Clarke Investigation, General Spalding testified to the Clarke Investigation that Bissell told him that, “You [Bissell] told him [Spalding] that certain messages had been received, these messages pertaining to Pearl Harbor and were in the files of G-2 and that you deemed it most necessary to destroy them.” General Bissell denied telling Colonel Spalding the preceding and stated that he told Spalding that, “I had been directed by the A. C. of S, G-2 to draft a message to the G-2 Hawaiian Department [Colonel Fielder] . . . to be prepared for possible sabotage. . . . I stated that, as I recall it, that I had stayed in the office one evening until about eight o’clock, at the direction of General Miles, who was then the A. C. of S., G-2, and had prepared a message alerting the Hawaiian Department for possible sabotage and stressing the strained relations between the U. S. and Japan. I took the message in to Gen. Miles personally. He read the message and change [sic] it materially, stressing the sabotage angle more than I had. That message, as far as I knew, was sent. The draft which I drew Gen. Miles destroyed as it was marked Secret.” See 34PHA101. General Bissell did not testify to the JCC, or to any other Pearl Harbor attack investigation except the Clarke Investigation. If the JCC had known about Bissell’s entire-Japanese-attack-plan information, perhaps they would have been interested in having him explain why he felt compelled to secretly give this information to the FBI after his boss, General Miles, “materially” changed Bissell’s proposed warning message to Hawaii.

Brigadier John Ter Bush Bissell should not be confused with General Clayton Bissell, who was Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in 1944 and 1945.

5. This name was redacted by the FBI circa 1979 when the document was first released by the FBI. The name was identified in 2002 when the FBI accessioned the information to

statement that if it ever got out that he had disclosed this information he would be fired), that about ten days before the attack on Pearl Harbor a number of Japanese radio intercepts had been obtained in Hawaii. When they were unable to break the code in these intercepts in Hawaii they sent them in to Washington where G2 [Army Intelligence Section] broke them. It was found that these radio messages contained substantially the complete plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor, as it was actually carried out. The messages also contained a code Japanese word which would be sent out by radio to the Japanese fleet as the signal for the attack, when this word was repeated three times in succession. A message was sent by Army radio to the Hawaiian Islands, setting forth this entire plan for the information of the authorities in Hawaii.

On Friday morning, December 5th, the code words referred to in the previous messages as the signal for the attack were intercepted, which would have indicated that the attack was to be on either Saturday or Sunday, and this information was sent by military radio to the Hawaiian Islands.

Colonel Bissell stated there was a great deal of inquiry going on at the present time of determining the reason for the fiasco at Hawaii, the inquiry being directed along two lines, first whether there was a breakdown in the military radio and a failure of the message to get across, or second whether the message was delivered and not acted upon by the military authorities. Colonel Bissell stated it was his understanding that when this all came out they would clean house in the Navy.<sup>6</sup>

The day after receiving Ladd's memo, Mr. Hoover, by telephone and letter advised President Roosevelt's Press Secretary Steven Early of essentially the same information.<sup>7</sup> The Chairman of the Roberts Com-



Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor during the attack on December 7, 1941. The admiral, who was blamed for not properly defending the island, was demoted and relieved of command ten days after the attack. He died in 1968, never having his honor or rank restored by the U.S. government.

mission, was advised of the same on December 17, and again on December 18, 1941, in Mr. Hoover's memoranda, in a paragraph titled, "Disregard of intelligence information."<sup>8</sup>

Moreover, Mr. Hoover suggested to Justice Roberts that: "Inquiry should be made as to the date those messages were received at Washington, the date of their transmittal to Hawaii, the details of the interception of the coded words, the identity of the officer charged with handling this information at Hawaii, and what action or consideration, if any, was given to this intelligence."<sup>9</sup> In other words, Mr. Hoover felt the entire-Japanese-attack-plan information was sufficiently credible to warrant a full-scale investigation of its origin, who received it and when, and the response to it.

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be sent by radio to the Japanese fleet as the signal for the attack when the word was repeated three times in succession. Military authorities in Washington sent by Army radio to the Hawaiian Islands the entire plan for the information of the authorities in Hawaii. On Friday morning, December 5th, the code word previously identified as the signal for the attack was intercepted, which indicated that the attack was to be made on Saturday or Sunday, and this information was sent by military radio to the Hawaiian Islands. At this time it is impossible to determine whether there was a breakdown in the military radio and a failure of the messages to reach their destination, or whether the messages were delivered, but not acted on, by the military authorities."

8. Mr. Hoover's letter to Honorable Owen J. Roberts, under date of December 18, 1941, declassified circa 1979. Author's file 2102—"PEARL HARBOR Documents from Mr. Hoover's and Mr. Nichols' Official Files." The letter states, "With reference to the memorandum that was left with you last night, I am enclosing herewith an additional memorandum which parallels the other memorandum. The enclosed memorandum is set forth in the form of investigative suggestions as to certain aspects of the situation in Hawaii, while the memorandum left with you last night was a narrative memorandum of the situation. The same material is covered in the enclosed memorandum with the exception that it is divided into what might be termed investigative suggestions. ...It has been reliably reported in connection with radio activities that about ten days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor a number of Japanese radio intercepts were obtained in Hawaii. The military authorities there, unable to break the code, forwarded these messages to Washington where they were deciphered, and it was found that these radio messages contained substantially the complete plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor, as it was actually carried out. The message was allegedly sent from Washington by Army radio to the Hawaiian Islands setting forth this whole plan, including code words which would be used by the Japanese to indicate the time of their attack on the islands. These code words were intercepted on Friday morning, December 5, 1941, by the military authorities."

9. Id.

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NARA.

6. Federal Bureau of Investigation MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, DATE 12/11/41, signed, "D M Ladd," author's file 2102—"PEARL HARBOR Documents from Mr. Hoover's and Mr. Nichols' Official Files."

7. Mr. Hoover's letter and memorandum to Steven Early, dated December 12, 1941, FDRL, Steven Early collection, declassified August 7, 1975, author's file 2216. "About ten days prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a number of Japanese radio messages were intercepted by military authorities in the Hawaiian Islands. Being unable to break the code in these intercepts, the messages were sent to Washington where Military Intelligence broke the code, discovered that the messages contained substantially the complete plans for the attack on Pearl Harbor as it was subsequently carried out. The messages contained a code Japanese word which would

## II. The Roberts Commission's Response to Mr. Hoover's Entire-Japanese-Attack-Plan Information

If true, Mr. Hoover's entire-Japanese-attack-plan information would have been the most relevant and material fact of all the Pearl Harbor investigations and would surely and rightly have damned Admiral Kimmel forever. So, what did Chairman Roberts do with the information after receiving it from Mr. Hoover?

Justice Roberts first interviewed all the top Washington officials<sup>10</sup> off the record, without inquiring about, or using Mr. Hoover's entire-Japanese-attack-plan information. This omission ignored Mr. Hoover's investigative suggestion to Chairman Roberts that he find out what useful intelligence, if any, had been intercepted in Washington. Chairman Roberts knew about MAGIC<sup>11</sup> and its importance, but he inexplicably refused to look at it even though it was the most logical origin of the entire-Japanese-attack-plan information, and despite Mr. Hoover's specific "investigative suggestions"<sup>12</sup> to do so.

Roberts then proceeded with his Commission to Honolulu where all the local witnesses were interviewed on the record. Roberts questioned the head of army intelligence in Hawaii, Colonel Fielder; and his assistant, Lt. Col. Bicknell using the language of Mr. Hoover's allegation against Admiral Kimmel even though no one in Washington was questioned this specifically. Both Fielder and Bicknell unequivocally denied any knowledge of this information – a denial which certainly must have signaled to Chairman Roberts that this alleged entire-Japanese-



attack-plan information never made it to Hawaii.

Again Chairman Roberts was faced with the obvious question: Was this entire-Japanese-attack-plan information ever received in Washington by Army and Navy intelligence? It appears that Chairman Roberts never pursued an answer and, in fact, simply dropped the matter. He did not follow the obvious logical investigative leads which might have revealed whether anyone in Washington, D.C. had received this critical information and then failed, or opted not to transmit it to the Hawaiian commanders.

## III. Justice Roberts' Testimony to the Joint Congressional Committee

In 1946, five years later, Congress and Senator Homer Ferguson investigated Pearl Harbor, but they did not know anything about the entire-Japanese-attack-plan information, because they were never apprised of the FBI's secret source information.

Remember that during the Roberts Commission, Justice Roberts questioned the head of army intelligence in Hawaii, Colonel Fielder; and his assistant, Lt. Col. Bicknell, using the language of Mr. Hoover's allegation

against Admiral Kimmel. Senator Ferguson set out to find out why Chairman Roberts used this very specific language when questioning Fielder and Bicknell. But, Justice Roberts managed to dissemble about both the source and contents of this information, presumably to protect himself and his Commission against charges that it failed to adequately investigate the allegations.

Senator Ferguson quoted Chairman Roberts from the 1941 transcript of testimony before the Roberts Commission where Roberts indicated that information had been provided to him indicating that about 10 days before the attack a Japanese code was broken in Washington indicating that a Japanese attack was planned, and that this information was forwarded to the military authorities in Hawaii.<sup>13</sup> Senator Ferguson

10. Secretary of State Hull, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, Army Chief of Staff Marshall, Chief of Naval Operations Stark, Chief of Army War Plans Gerow, Chief of Navy War Plans Turner, Chief of Army Intelligence Miles, and Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence Wilkinson.

11. MAGIC was a codeword for the secret American decoding of Japanese diplomatic and spy messages prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, which gave indications of the time, place, reason, and deceit plan to cover the attack. The Hawaiian commanders, Kimmel and Short, were given none of this information.

12. See footnote 8.

13. 7PHA3276; 22PHA176; **Senator FERGUSON:** You were the chairman and this is in your language [Ferguson reading from the 1941 Roberts Commission transcript]:

**CHAIRMAN ROBERTS:** It has been reported to me that about 10 days before the attack a code was intercepted which could not be

tried to find out where Chairman Roberts obtained this information by asking him point blank:

**Senator FERGUSON:** What were you talking about?

**Mr. Justice ROBERTS:** I was talking about some information that had been given to me somewhere around Pearl Harbor. People were coming to me all the time telling me that there was such and such a rumor. You see I say "It has been reported to me."<sup>14</sup>

Not satisfied with Roberts' response, Senator Ferguson pressed further. Even specifically quoting Roberts' questioning of Colonel Fielder and Lt. Col. Bicknell of Army Intelligence in Hawaii, Ferguson was not successful in getting Roberts to admit where he had gotten this information.

First, with regard to Colonel Fielder:

**Senator FERGUSON:** Mr. Justice, this last part:

**CHAIRMAN ROBERTS:** [A]nd that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio these

three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here.

**Colonel FIELDER:** I have no knowledge of that whatever.

**CHAIRMAN ROBERTS:** You know nothing about it?

**Colonel FIELDER:** No.

**CHAIRMAN ROBERTS:** You had no com-



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broken, but it was forwarded to Washington to the War Department to be broken, and the War Department found out it could be broken and did break it, and found it contained three important signal words which would direct the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here [Hawaii] as an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned....

14. 7PHA3276. This is the first denial by Justice Roberts that he knew Mr. Hoover was his source of information. The second denial followed immediately: Senator FERGUSON: Mr. Justice, this last part - and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio these three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here....

**Mr. Justice ROBERTS:** Surely. Somebody had told me that or I wouldn't have asked the question.

munications from the War Department as of December 5th forwarding to you the meaning of the three code words which would be the signal for the attack?

**Colonel FIELDER:** No sir, it never came to my attention.<sup>15</sup>

And then with regard to Lt. Col. Bicknell:

**CHAIRMAN ROBERTS:** I refer to something else which you may or may not know anything about. I refer to the fact that some ten days before December it is supposed that a Japanese code message you intercepted and was broken down by the Department

in Washington, one of the military departments, which gave certain key words which would be flashed over the radio directing the attack on Pearl Harbor.

**Colonel BICKNELL:** (Asst. G-2 Intelligence, Hawaii): Yes.

**CHAIRMAN ROBERTS:** And that, having broken that down, one of the military establishment in Washington caught over the radio the three

key words and relayed them here to you. When I say "you," to the Islands -

**Colonel BICKNELL:** Yes.

**CHAIRMAN ROBERTS:** Do you know of any such story?

**Colonel BICKNELL:** I never heard of such a thing, no, sir.

**CHAIRMAN ROBERTS:** Never heard of it?

**Colonel BICKNELL:** No, sir.

**CHAIRMAN ROBERTS:** I have no other questions.<sup>16</sup>

Senator Ferguson stopped reading from the 1941 transcript and again queried Justice Roberts as to where he got this information:

**Mr. Justice ROBERTS:** I was talking about the same rumors that had come to me from

15. 7PHA3276; 22PHA176.

16. 7PHA3277, 22PHA192-193.

somewhere.<sup>17</sup>

**Senator FERGUSON:** Did you follow that up? I have looked over the testimony and I haven't been able to find it but I want to know now, from your recollection, do you know whether you ever tried to follow that up here in Washington after you failed on Bicknell and Fielder?

**Mr. Justice ROBERTS:** Yes, sir. We asked for all the messages there were about any broken codes and we were told we had had all they had except this MAGIC thing.<sup>18</sup>

In spite of Mr. Hoover's counsel that "[i]nquiry should be made as to the dates those messages were received in Washington," when Chairman Roberts could not find Mr. Hoover's entire-Japanese-attack-plan information as he expected in Hawaii, he dropped the matter, and did not pursue it in Washington. In other words, although Roberts knew about MAGIC he did not attempt to find out the content of the MAGIC messages even though they were the most likely source of the entire-Japanese-attack-plan information. Senator Ferguson could not believe what he was hearing.

**Senator FERGUSON:** Do I understand you did not get the MAGIC?

**Mr. Justice ROBERTS:** No; we were never shown one of the MAGIC messages.

**Senator FERGUSON:** Not one?

**Mr. Justice ROBERTS:** Not one.

**Senator FERGUSON:** Were you ever shown the substance of the MAGIC messages?

**Mr. Justice ROBERTS:** No, sir.

**Senator FERGUSON:** Did you know there were such messages?

**Mr. Justice ROBERTS:** Well, I knew that the Army or Navy or State Department had been cracking a super code of the Japanese for weeks or months and that they had been

taking off all kinds of information. We asked the War Department and the Navy Department to tell us what they got from that and they told us. They did not show us the messages, any of them, and I didn't ask them to.

Incredulous at Roberts' admission, Senator Ferguson expressed his disbelief that the Commission could find that all those in Washington had performed their jobs admirably.

**Senator FERGUSON:** That being true how was this finding possible, on page 19 ...

**Senator FERGUSON:** (reading from the 1942 Roberts Commission Report)



The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the War and Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advising them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with Japan. Now, I merely mean if you didn't have any of these messages, for instance, the message setting the deadline of the 29th, the pilot message, the 1 o'clock mes-

sage, the 13-part message up until midnight or 9 o'clock, and the 14th part and 1 o'clock message on Sunday morning, how could the commission make a finding, if they didn't have the facts?...

**Senator FERGUSON:** All right. Then we come to the next finding in your conclusions:

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof.

Now, without having the intercepted MAGIC messages, did you make this finding? I will put it that way.

**Mr. Justice ROBERTS:** Why, certainly. The Chief of Staff and Admiral Stark told us and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy told us that every time Hull gave them a warning they would go and repeat

17. 7PHA3277; This is the third denial that he knew Mr. Hoover was his source of information.

18. 7PHA3277-78

it to the Chief of Staff and to the Admiral. I did not need to look at any messages to find out whether Marshall and Stark had been sufficiently warned. That is all I was interested in.

**Senator FERGUSON:** Now, Justice, the Secretary of the Navy and the

Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the President, and Secretary of State were each being furnished this MAGIC. Did you not know that they were all being furnished the MAGIC?

**Mr. Justice ROBERTS:** I did not know it and I would not have been interested in it. . . .

**Senator FERGUSON:** Do you have something to say?

**Mr. Justice ROBERTS:** Let's investigate the Roberts Commission. I would not have been interested in it, Senator. I wanted to know whether the military men were put on full warning and put on their toes by the men who did have the information. I got a unanimous statement that they were.<sup>19</sup>

Senator Ferguson expressed his opinion on the quality of the Roberts Commission's investigation in his report:

*It is extremely unfortunate that the Roberts Commission Report was so hasty, inconclusive, and incomplete. Some witnesses were examined under oath; others were not. Much testimony was not even recorded. The Commission knew that Japanese messages had been intercepted and were available, prior to the attack, to the high command in Washington. The Commission did not inquire about what information these intercepts contained, who received them or what was done about them, although the failure of Washington to inform the commanders in Hawaii of this vital intelligence bears directly on the question of whether those com-*



manders performed their full duties. Mr. Justice Roberts testified before this Committee:

*"I would not have bothered to read it (the intercepted Japanese traffic) if it had been shown to me."<sup>20</sup>*

It is noteworthy, that Chairman Roberts' sole source for the entire-Japanese-attack-plan information was

Mr. Hoover, yet Mr. Hoover was not called upon to testify before the Roberts Commission. Indeed, Mr. Hoover did not testify at any Pearl Harbor investigation, and even refused the Army Pearl Harbor Board's request to do so. Mr. Hoover's entire-Japanese-attack-plan memoranda to President Roosevelt and to Chairman Roberts were not provided to any Pearl Harbor investigation other than to Chairman Roberts,<sup>21</sup> and were not declassified until 1975, and 1979, respectively. If they had been made public, it is hard to imagine that Mr. Hoover would have been allowed to avoid testifying.

It is also noteworthy, that Chairman Roberts did not ask Admiral Kimmel about the entire-Japanese-attack plan information. Indeed, years later Admiral Kimmel testified to the JCC that:

*I do not intend to suggest that any of these responsible officers deliberately misled the Roberts Commission as to my receipt of the MAGIC messages. It was tragic, however, that the Commission did not ask me about this matter.<sup>22</sup>*

## Conclusion

Chairman Roberts was, apparently, not interested in answering Congress' question, but for anyone else who is, and wants to know "Why, with some of the finest intelligence available in our history. . . was it possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur," an answer may lie in as yet undisclosed, or un-located FBI files, as it is hard to

19. 7PHA3278-3280

20. 7PHA3280

21. It is not clear from the known record whether or not Chairman Roberts shared Mr. Hoover's memoranda with the other members of his Commission.

22. 6PHA2553, Admiral Kimmel's statement to the JCC.

believe that the FBI did not investigate Colonel Bissell's entire-Japanese-attack-plan information thoroughly.

To properly serve history and right an appalling injustice, these presumed files must be located and reviewed. Only then, can we truly answer Congress' "one enigmatical and paramount question"; one that Americans have sought to answer since December 7, 1941. 🐦

Thomas K. Kimmel, Jr. is a Pearl Harbor scholar, a former 25-year career FBI agent, and eldest grandson of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor during the attack on December 7, 1941. His grandfather was based at Pearl Harbor when Japanese dive-bombers and torpedo planes attacked Hawaii on December 7, 1941. The admiral, who was blamed for not properly defending the island, was demoted and relieved of command ten days after the attack. He died in 1968, never having had his honor or rank restored by the U.S. government. Many consider him a scapegoat and part of a quick coverup to limit blame. Tom has made it his mission to correct the record with historical scholarship and through his writings and speaking engagements to remedy this unfair mischaracterization that has reached the public and often remains uncorrected.

A graduate of the US Naval Academy, Tom served on three warships during the Vietnam War and attended John Marshall Law School prior to joining the FBI. Tom investigated organized crime in Cleveland, served on the House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff at CIA Headquarters, headed the FBI in East Texas, the Labor Racketeering Unit at FBI Headquarters, the National Drug Intelligence Center in Johnstown, PA, and served on the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. Tom was also the Assistant Agent in Charge of the Philadelphia FBI Division heading the Foreign Counterintelligence and Terrorism Programs during the 1<sup>st</sup> attack on the World Trade Center in 1993.

Upon retiring from the Bureau, Tom served as a consultant to the FBI, addressing major spy scandals in the FBI and CIA. Tom has appeared at the *National Press Club* in Washington, DC, twice on *60 Minutes*, on *War Stories Investigates with Oliver North*, and spoken throughout the United States, Canada, Columbia, and Japan to hundreds of groups of all ages frequently as a repeat speaker.

Co-author J. A. Williams, Esq., graduated number one in the New York Law School Class of 1993, and practiced civil and criminal law in New York and New Jersey.

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#### THOMAS KIMMEL SPEECH TOPICS

1. *Adm. Kimmel's Case: The Story within the Pearl Harbor Story* — Admiral Kimmel's grandson reveals the real reasons for the success of the Japanese attack.
2. *Adm. Kimmel's Case: The Pearl Harbor and 9/11 Attacks Compared* — Lt. Cdr and former FBI agent Kimmel reveals Pearl Harbor mistakes repeated on 9/11.
3. *Adm. Kimmel's Case: The FBI's Role in the Pearl Harbor Attack* — A former FBI agent investigates the FBI's role in the Pearl Harbor Attack.
4. *Adm. Kimmel's Case: "Why Was It Possible for a Pearl Harbor to Occur?"* — J. Edgar Hoover thought he knew, so why did the President's representative not investigate?—a former FBI agent explains.
5. *Adm. Kimmel's Case: What Else Did Mr. Hoover Hide from Pearl Harbor Investigators?*— Admiral Kimmel's grandson has made a list.
6. *Adm. Kimmel's Case: Pearl Harbor Perjury* — Subornation of perjury is revealed by a former FBI agent.
7. *Adm. Kimmel's Case: Spying on America* — A former FBI agent reveals the most successful espionage operation of all time—and it was against America.
8. *Adm. Kimmel's Case: It Ain't Over Yet* — What's new in the Pearl Harbor story — Admiral Kimmel's grandson has made another list.
9. *Adm. Kimmel's Case: Newt Gingrich's Solution* — Lt. Cdr. Kimmel wraps it up.

AFIO thanks Admiral Mac Showers and Gene Poteat for their important assessments and endorsements of this article. Admiral Showers added: "Tom's story is a fascinating piece of evidence and it deserves to be published. It shows the shenanigans that represented much of the FBI and J. Edgar Hoover's ways of doing business, and it also displays the probable fact that, if handled properly (as the Big DNI is trying to do today), the Pearl Harbor attack would have been known in advance. But, I do agree with Tom's comment that his evidence "suggests" rather than "confirms." I am not a disciple of the "FDR knew" story, but this brings us closer to seeing that he could have known."

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#### EDITORIAL NOTE FROM GENE POTEAT

The two greatest intelligence failures in our history were the failure to predict Pearl Harbor and 9/11 - with the ensuing Congressional investigations yielding strikingly similar conclusions, though clear-cut answers to all the questions raised are not in agreement. Both investigations raised more questions than were answered: who knew what, and when?; did U.S. policies and actions contribute to the attacks?; or was the intelligence either ignored or simply not shared with those that needed it? The Pearl Harbor case has been studied by prominent writers for over 60 years. To name a few, Wohlsletter, Lee, Stinnett, and lately, Wilford, and soon to include Professor Brian Villa of the University of Ottawa. Interestingly, Kimmel and Williams have uncovered new evidence that sheds new light on the Pearl Harbor question, which makes us include their findings and good questions in this issue.