

December 4, 2007

Dear Air Force Magazine,

Subject article (attached), *Caught on the Ground*, by John T. Correll, "Air Force Magazine online," December 2007, Vol. 90, No. 12, recently came to my attention. I am a former naval officer, a retired FBI agent, the eldest grandson of Admiral Kimmel, and a Naval Academy student of Admiral Kimmel's successor at Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nimitz.

Civilian writers unfamiliar with Admiral Nimitz's writings, who have not steered away from the pitfalls of amateur military analysis are quoted as authority in Mr. Correll's article: Messrs. Prange, Goldstein, Polmar, and Lambert. All have repeatedly and inexplicably written, without apology, as Mr. Correll has that, "The Martin-Bellinger report and other analyses said the greatest vulnerability for air attack was from the north and northwest." Please read *The Martin-Bellinger report*, so that this outrageous misrepresentation can be corrected. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Carlisle A. H. Trost did so, and wrote to the Secretary of the Navy John Dalton, under date of 4 October 1994 that,

[T]he Martin-Bellinger estimate of March 1941, which the Director of Naval History informed me in his report predicted that an air attack, if one came, would be launched from the north or northwest, ***nowhere states that the most dangerous sectors were the north and northwest.*** The words "north" and "northwest" do not appear *in* the text, nor do any equivalent nautical or numerical terms.

I have attached copies of both the Trost letter and the Martin-Bellinger estimate. Please read them. You can find both on my website: <http://www.pearlharbor911attacks.com/>, as well.

Perhaps Mr. Correll could benefit from Nimitz, and his co-author, the leading naval historian of his day, E. B. Potter's counsel that,

- “It is the duty of every person interested in the national defense to read and understand such a book as Sea Power.” Nimitz.
- “Every page of Sea Power reflects the influence of Admiral Nimitz.” Potter.
- “It was [Nimitz] chiefly who steered the civilian writers away from the pitfalls of amateur military analysis.” Potter.
  - » Sea Power, Nimitz/Potter, 1960, pp.vi-viii
- **“Admiral Kimmel had been given no information which would justify interrupting a very urgent training program.”**
  - » Admiral Nimitz, Sea Power, 1960, p.650

Admiral Kimmel requested that the Joint Congressional Committee call Admiral Nimitz as a witness. They refused.

The article states that, “If there were not enough airplanes to patrol all approaches to Oahu, it was also true that air attack was not equally probable from every direction. Japan was not likely to strike from the east, the California side of the island.”

Again, Admiral Nimitz would disagree and so wrote to Admiral King on January 7, 1942 after predicting that,

“The attack will be followed by others,” and continuing that, *“It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely be left unguarded.* The fuel problem is no deterrent....If even an approach from the east were attempted. . . . There is no answer to this [effective air defense] except more plans (17PHA2489-90).”

The article states, “The Nov. 27 war warning message to Short directed him to undertake reconnaissance and other measures as required.” Left unsaid was that this message ordered Short to protect against sabotage and to report measures taken. He reported back to Marshall, his only uniformed boss, that, he was protecting against sabotage. As the Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded it was Marshall’s responsibility to correct Short, if Short was doing the wrong thing. Marshall did not do so.

The article states, “The United States had broken the Japanese diplomatic code and had been intercepting and reading the message traffic since the summer of 1940. The diplomatic correspondence did not have much detail on military or naval matters. . .” The author is referring to MAGIC—the codeword for the secret American decoding of Japanese diplomatic and spy communications before the attack, which gave indications of the time, place, reason, and deceit plan to cover the attack. The article does not mention that Kimmel and Short received none of this information, although it was supplied to Admiral Hart and General MacArthur in the Philippines and to the British. The importance of MAGIC was explained by the head of Army intelligence, General Miles, and the JCC Chief Assistant Counsel Gesell as, “the most reliable and authentic information which the War Department was receiving as to Japanese intentions and activities. . . . some of these messages. . . were not of a diplomatic nature, they were of a military nature (2PHA792).”

The article states, “Between 1941 and 1946, there were eight official investigations of the Pearl Harbor disaster, including inquiries by the Army, the Navy, and a joint Congressional committee.” Actually there were nine, but left unsaid was that Admiral Kimmel’s efforts initiated the last seven investigations and the only one that accorded Admiral Kimmel the opportunity to defend himself, the Naval Court of Inquiry exonerated him. The Naval Court of Inquiry approved of all of Admiral Kimmel’s force dispositions, found that he committed no errors of judgment, and opined that he had done everything possible under the circumstances. In fact, Fleet Admiral Nimitz, who succeeded Kimmel, reissued the same readiness directive that Kimmel had in place on December 7<sup>th</sup>.

Former Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence Admiral Tom Brooks recently wrote that,

“Chief of Staff Marshall, Chief of Naval Operations Stark, Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, and Secretary of State Hull, among others—[tried] to cover up their mistakes with regard to the Pearl Harbor attack, and to fix the blame on the Hawaii

commanders at the time of attack. . . [S]enior Army and Navy officials committed perjury, suborned perjury, destroyed evidence, and intimidated witnesses. Testimony during the nine investigations... presents a sordid picture of Washington officials covering themselves at the expense of the two Pearl Harbor commanders. Kimmel and Short[']s... seniors in Washington shared culpability and acted in a disgraceful fashion in their attempt to deflect all the blame. **For this reason alone, a compelling case can be made to restore Kimmel and Short to their pre-war ranks.** (*Proceedings*, May 2007, Admiral Brooks' review of The Pearl Harbor Myth, p.170)."

The silence of the author, and his quoted historians, to admitted *official* perjury continues to disappoint.

Regards,  
Tom Kimmel  
321.446-0897 cell  
TKIMMEL@CFL.RR.COM  
Kimmel website at: [http://www.pearlharbor911attacks.com/Admiral Kimmel's Story](http://www.pearlharbor911attacks.com/AdmiralKimmel'sStory),  
at: <http://www.rooseveltmyth.com/KimmelStory/>

February 25, 2008

Dear Air Force Magazine,

You published a greatly shortened version of my comments on subject article, *Caught on the Ground*, by John T. Correll, “Air Force Magazine online,” December 2007, Vol. 90, No. 12, along with Mr. Correll’s reply in your February 2008 edition—see attached. Here is my response to Mr. Correll’s reply.

Regards,  
Tom Kimmel  
321.446-0897 cell

**Tom Kimmel responds to Mr. Correll’s reply in Air Force Magazine February 2008**  
**Vol. 91, No. 2**

Mr. Correll manfully admits that Gordon Prange, Donald Goldstein (Prange’s actual author), and he erred and that the Martin-Bellinger report does **not** identify north and northwest as the most dangerous sectors, as Mr. Goldstein mis-reported in both *At Dawn We Slept*, in 1981, and again in *Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History*, in 1986. Mr. Correll explained his error—he relied on Prange and Goldstein as “recognized authority on Pearl Harbor.” So far, so good, but then Mr. Correll inexplicably attempts to argue anew that notwithstanding the previous error the north and northwest were convincingly identified as the most dangerous sectors. His source is again Prange and Goldstein. My goodness, *fool me once*.

Apparently, determined to get the word “northwest” into the Farthing Report, Mr. Correll wrote that the August 20, 1941 Farthing Report said that “*the most probable direction for air attack would be from western quadrants, either northwest or southwest (Defenseless: Command Failure at Pearl Harbor, John Lambert and Norman Polmar, p. 108).*” The Farthing Report actually said that, the enemy’s “most probable avenue of approach is the hemisphere from 0°, counterclockwise to 180 degrees around Oahu”—in other words from the west. The terms “north,” or “northwest” do not appear anywhere in the Farthing Report. Tellingly, Admirals Richardson, Halsey, Layton, and Kimmel all testified that they thought an attack, if it came, would come from the west.

Mr. Correll wrote, “Bellinger testified that he was ‘in agreement with Admiral Davis. . . that the greatest possibility of a successful air attack lay in an attack coming in from the sector of the north’ (Verdict [Prange and Goldstein], p. 438).” Admiral Davis testified at the Hart Inquiry only, but as alleged by Prange, and Goldstein, he did not state that he predicted an attack from “a sector of the north.” His actual response was as follows:

**Question:** A considerable arc to the north and west and another to the south and west were the most important; is that true?

**Answer:** Yes, sir, that is true, but it doesn’t naturally follow that they would be certainly sufficient [26PHA109].

Davis further stated that, “My duty as Fleet Aviation Officer was primarily, if not almost entirely, concerned with technical training and logistics matters. . . I, myself, had little to do with considerations of attack possibilities, and I do not recall ever being directly consulted on such matters by the Commander-in-Chief [Kimmel].[26PHA104]”

Bellinger testified that, “Hindsight is one thing and foresight is another. This situation at Pearl Harbor was another (8PHA3489).” He also testified that, “Considering shortages and deficiencies, other necessary deployment of forces, such as expansion training and development of facilities, and lacking unity of command, little if any more in the way of readiness could be expected. It is believed that Admiral Kimmel saw this picture very realistically and I know of no man who, under the circumstances, could have done more (26PHA140).”

Perhaps this, attributed to Bellinger, expresses what Bellinger truly thought: “[The Pearl Harbor attack] was a deep-dyed, deliberate plan to get this Country into war with Japan and Germany by needling the Japanese into making the first war move. FDR and his cohorts criminally failed to keep Admiral Kimmel informed of information that was available—information that the simplest mind would have known was of vital importance to the protection of the Pacific Fleet (Bellinger, Paolo E. Coletta, 1987; Manuscript Skipper Steely biography of Admiral J. O. Richardson, 2008).”

For an excellent analysis of *primary sources* concerning the most-dangerous-sector myth I refer you to Professor Michael Gannon’s “Reopen

the Kimmel Case,” which you can find on my website at:  
[WWW.PEARLHARBOR911ATTACKS.COM](http://WWW.PEARLHARBOR911ATTACKS.COM).